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Following the cold war a new kind of threat emerged; terrorism became the most 
important threat used by individuals, organizations and countries to reach their goals.  
Turkey has suffered from terrorism for years.  In Turkey, the main logistic resource for 
the terrorist is the villages located in remote areas.  A search operation is one of the 
techniques used to capture the terrorists.  Five village search operations scenarios are 
developed based on a previous study done for the New Zealand Army and the author’s 
personal experiences.  For this study, the agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata) is used.  To investigate the effects of 16 variables state-of-the-art 
Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube Designs are used.  With a personal computer and the 
computational capabilities of supercomputers run by Mitre for the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab (MCWL) approximately 15000 runs are completed.  In comparing the 
five scenarios, the significant effects on the outcome of a possible skirmish in search 
operations are the proficiency level of the soldiers, the employment of village guards and 
the support of the local people to the terrorists.  The results of the analysis suggest that 
the most important factor affecting the Blue casualties is the initial speed and 
synchronization of the Blue search unit entering the village and the most important factor 
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Although there are no commonly accepted definitions of terror and terrorism, the 
American College Heritage dictionary defines terror as “violence committed or 
threatened to intimidate or coerce, as for military or political purposes,” and terrorism as 
“the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence to intimidate or coerce societies 
or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.” 
Like many of the countries in the world Turkey has been suffering for years from 
the threat that emerged after the Cold War called terrorism.  Today, terrorism is the most 
prominent threat used by individuals, organizations and countries to achieve their goals, 
plans or actions.  Turkey has suffered from terrorism since the early sixties, which 
coincides with a time when youth movements were growing around the world.  
Following the youth movements, the 1980s were the beginning of a new threat facing the 
Turkish population.  This threat is the terrorist organization called KADEK (Kurdistan 
Democratic Congress), previously known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).  Four 
students at the University of Ankara, Abdullah Ocalan, Kesire Yildirim Ocalan, Hakki 
Karaer and Cemil Bayik founded the PKK in 1974.  KADEK is based on Marxist-
Leninist ideology and aims to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern 
Turkey.  KADEK is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States. [Ref 1]  
KADEK has been the most lethal terrorist organization in Turkish history.   
In order to achieve their goals, terrorist organizations aim to gain the support of 
the local people while continuing fighting with the security forces.  They usually exploit 
the existing political, economic and social conditions and offer an alternative plan based 
on their ideology to solve the problems.  Any means is considered to be legal to the 
terrorist organizations to obtain the support of the people.  They may try to convince, 
encourage, force or threaten when necessary.  Unlike the terrorist organizations, the 
security forces that are countering them have to react within the boundaries of the rules  
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set by law.  Public support is the key factor to both sides.  While the security forces are 
countering the terrorist organizations the government takes the necessary measures to 
ameliorate the conditions causing dissatisfaction amongst the people. 
The focus of the security forces in fighting terrorism is on the support links.  The 
security forces aim to cut the support links between the population and the terrorists.  For 
these purposes the security forces conduct different types of operations.  Search 
operations are one of the types of operation conducted in this process and their goals are 
listed as: [Ref 23] 
• To capture the terrorists or to eliminate them. 
• To obtain intelligence. 
• To isolate the terrorists 
• The cut the support link between the population and the terrorists. 
In this study we focus on village search operations.  Village search operations are 
conducted with the same goals mentioned above.  In Turkey, villages located in remote 
areas have been the main logistic support for the terrorists.  People living in these areas 
have been convinced, forced or threatened to support KADEK.  Throughout this study we 
focus on the factors that might affect the results of a search operation.  The questions in 
this thesis are based on a previous study done by New Zealand’s Defense Technology 
Agency for the New Zealand Army and the author’s personal experience.  The study aims 
to answers the following questions: 
• How does the proficiency level of the soldiers attending a search operation 
affect the outcome of the operation when a skirmish occurs? 
• How does the employment of village guards (villagers volunteer to protect 
their villages against terrorists) affect the results of a village search 
operations? 
• Does the behavior of the villagers affect the search operations?  What 
happens when they are sympathetic to the terrorists? 
• Does the employment of a reserve unit provide the necessary assistance to 
the force conducting a search operation?  
In order to answer these questions and to explore the main factors affecting the 
outcome of a search operation we use the agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata).  Why do we use an agent-based model instead of a conventional 
 xx
equation-based model?  This is because of the non-linear nature of the low-intensity 
conflict and the importance of the human component in guerilla warfare.  What we mean 
by the human component can be better explained by an example.  Consider a 
peacekeeping operation.  The capability of an equation-based model to explain the non-
linearity and intangibles in these kinds of operations is lacking.  This is because the 
human component is the most dominant factor in peacekeeping operations.  Let’s 
suppose that the security forces are trying to separate two opponent groups.  The factors 
that might be taken into consideration are the initial aggressiveness of the groups, the 
fear, and the behavior of the leaders in the groups as well as the techniques and the 
amount of forces used by the security forces to alleviate the tension of the groups.  It is 
obvious that the model used to simulate such operations should be able to handle non-
linearity quite well.  Agent-based models provide this ability with agents acting 
autonomously.  An agent is the basic entity defined in an agent-based model.  He can 
sense, learn and act autonomously during the simulation.  In this study, we model a 
scenario in order to investigate the importance of the villagers’ behavior in a search 
operation.  MANA provides the ability to model such situations.  Propaganda can also be 
modeled or one can investigate the importance of the behavior of a leader in affecting the 
groups’ behaviors.  The factors stated so far are all parts of the intangibles of the human 
characteristics that can be stated as: fear, leadership, aggression, fatigue, morale, trust, 
help and so forth.   
Another important property of agent-based models is in the ease of modeling.  It 
might take months to model a scenario in one of the conventional models while this 
process just takes a few days to do it with agent-based models. 
To explore the main factors affecting the result of a search operation and to 
answer the questions stated above, approximately 15,000 runs are made using personal 
computers and the computational capabilities of supercomputers run by Mitre for the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  Hypothesis tests, bootstrapping and regression 
trees are the main techniques used in this analysis.  Different software packages like JMP 
(JUMP), S-PLUS and Excel are used throughout the study.  The primary conclusions 
drawn from the analyses are: 
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• The proficiency level of the soldiers and the equipment used significantly 
affect the outcome of a search operation.  Thus, professional soldiers are 
preferred to conscripts. 
• The employment of village guards is highly beneficial in decreasing Blue 
casualties, at least as modeled in the scenario.     
• The support of the local people is critical to the Blue forces.  For a village 
search operation, the support of the villagers to the terrorists highly affects 
the number of Blue casualties.  The support of the local people is critical 
to the terrorists too.  In particular, they provide caches for them to hide if 
surprised by the Blue.  Figure 1 displays how significant the support is to 
the terrorists.  The number of Red casualties decreases significantly when 



















Figure 1.   Comparisons of Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
• Intelligence is a key factor for search operations.  The Blue forces should 
have the information about the presence of any kinds of caches or tunnels 
built in the area. 
• The employment of a reserve unit clearly increases the number of Red 
casualties but may not decrease the number of Blue casualties.  In this 
case, the risk that the commander would like to take should be taken into 
consideration.  
• The speed of the Blue forces inserted into the village is the most important 
factor affecting the Blue casualties.  In Figure 2 the important factors 
obtained from the regression trees and the linear regression are displayed.  
Both techniques display the same factors as being the most important 




0.9051 1.4120 1.3250 2.1690
 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F
SearchT_MSpeed 1 1 4.934841677 75.49629 5.13E-11
Ter_OC3_Stealth 1 1 4.060424099 62.11891 6.98E-10
Ter_OC3_OT3 1 1 3.032083611 46.38671 2.42E-08  
 
Figure 2.   Regression Tree for Blue Casualties and the Most Important Factors 
Obtained From the Linear Regression of Blue Casualties 
 
• The Red stealth is the most important factor affecting Red casualties and it 
is also an important factor affecting Blue casualties.   
• Red aggressiveness is an important factor affecting both Red and Blue 
casualties.  The casualties of the Blue forces decrease when Red avoids 
contacting the Blue.   
• Reliable communication has an important impact on Blue casualties.   
• The presence of civilians impacts the effectiveness of the search 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an explanation of the purposes and the motivation for this 
thesis.  The purpose of the thesis is to answer four operational questions about village 
search operations using the agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata).  In this chapter, we also explain the reason for doing search operations in 
villages, why villages are suitable for terrorist organizations like KADEK (The Kurdistan 
Democratic Congress), and the nature of this insurgency.  We also define the four 
operational questions for the research and the reasons we use MANA to answer these 
questions. 
B. TERROR AND TERRORISM 
There are no commonly accepted definitions of terror and terrorism.  Almost all 
countries and organizations have different perceptions of a terrorist act.  A person defined 
as a terrorist by one country or organization is sometimes defined as a warrior of freedom 
by others.  This makes the war against terrorism more difficult. 
While definitions vary, the American College Heritage dictionary defines terror 
as “violence committed or threatened to intimidate or coerce, as for military or political 
purposes,” and terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence to 
intimidate or coerce societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons.” 
C. THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN TURKEY 
Following the Cold War, a new kind of threat emerged.  Today, terrorism is the 
most prominent threat used by individuals, organizations or countries expecting to 
achieve their goals.  Turkey has been suffering from terrorism since the early sixties as a 
result of the youth movements, which arose all around the world.  Until the 1980’s the 
Turkish security forces had to deal with these movements.  In 1974, students at the 
University of Ankara, Abdullah Ocalan, Kesire Yildirim Ocalan, Hakki Karaer and Cemil 
Bayik founded Turkey’s most lethal terrorist organization: KADEK, known previously as 
PKK (The Kurdistan Workers Party).  The US government also recognizes KADEK as a 
terrorist organization. [Ref 1]  Based on Marxist-Leninist ideology KADEK aims to 
establish an Independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.  Since 1984, KADEK has 
1 
killed 5,546 security guards, 4,027 of these guards were soldiers, 1,265 were village 
guards and 254 were policeman.  In addition, a total of 11,383 security guards were 
wounded.  Furthermore, in these incidents, a total of 4,561 citizens have been killed and 
5,860 wounded. [Ref 1]   
D. THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY  
To succeed, insurgencies mobilize material and human resources as support to 
achieve their goals, actions and plans.  With mobilization, the insurgencies obtain the 
necessary human resources and supplies.  The reason these terrorists can secure a large-
scale mobilization and financial support is owing to the dissatisfaction of the population 
with the current social and political conditions.  The insurgent leadership offers a new 
program that exploits the dissatisfaction of the local people.  The insurgent leadership 
then uses all means to transform the public’s dissatisfaction into political action.  [Ref 3] 
The primary goal of the insurgents is to receive the active support of a 
plurality of politically active people and the passive acquiescence of the 
passive majority. [Ref 3] 
Winning the support of the population is the key factor of victory for the insurgent 
group.  The same objective applies for counter-insurgency.  Both sides attempt to 
convince the population about the justice of their policies.  In order to reach its goal, the 
insurgent group will use any means necessary, such as threats, force or propaganda.  But 
the counter-insurgency is expected to adopt only positive measures.  KADEK also use the 
same means; it encourages, forces or threatens people to raise money or to assist its 
members’ needs and in this sense the villages assume a crucial role.  The main sources of 
support for KADEK activities come from internal and external donations and from drug 
trafficking.  Since KADEK mostly operates in rural areas, one of its weaknesses is its 
dependency on local support, which allows the security forces to control KADEK’s 
movements and intervene. 
Intelligence is a crucial issue.  All counter-insurgency operations should be based 
on intelligence.  Thus, an effective tactical intelligence network is highly important to the 
security forces.  In order to maximize the information, security forces should closely 
coordinate with the local population. 
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E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The villages in southeastern Turkey are a primary source of members, money and 
logistics for the insurgent group.  Thus, countering KADEK requires controlling the 
villages.  The Turkish Armed Forces have conducted successful search operations in 
villages since 1984, which has been of critical importance in defeating KADEK.  In 
August 2000, I was assigned as a company commander in Turkey’s Special Operation 
Forces.  During this duty, I participated in some village search operations that were based 
on intelligence reports. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the various outcomes of one of those 
operations in a designated village, if a skirmish had occurred.  Special areas to explore 
include: 
• Different units in the area conduct search operations.  Some consist of 
conscripts and some consist of professional soldiers.  How does the 
proficiency level of soldiers conducting a search operation affect the 
hypothetical Blue (security forces), Red (insurgent group), and neutral 
(villagers) casualties? 
• The Turkish government employs village guards who voluntarily protect 
their village against terrorists.  The guards, who are provided some small 
arms and radios, are one of the main sources of intelligence.  How do 
village guards affect a search operation? 
• The support of the local people is crucial to the insurgency and counter-
insurgency.  How does this support affect a search operation? 
• A model has been built for the New Zealand army by New Zealand’s 
Defense Technology Agency (DTA) and applied to a village search 
operation.  Their conclusions are that the speed at which an inner cordon is 
inserted is critical to the success of a cordon and search mission; also 
blocking tactics are superior to chasing tactics. [Ref 4]  In this model, no 
reserve units are deployed.  But, usually in search operations commanders 
maintain a reserve unit for flexibility purposes.  How would a reserve unit 
affect the possible outcomes of a village search operation? 
This research employs an agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform 





F. WHY AGENT-BASED MODELS (MANA)? 
All models are wrong, but some are useful. 
- George E. P. Box 
Guerrilla warfare is military and paramilitary operations conducted in 
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous 
forces. [Ref 3] 
By nature, guerilla warfare differs from conventional battles and can be 
considered as a peoples’ war.  The goal is to win the support of the local population while 
fighting the enemy.  Thus, the local population sometimes becomes either the object or 
the subject of the struggle. [Ref 5] 
The highly non-linear nature of guerilla warfare makes it impossible to model 
with equation-based models.  The main disadvantage of equation-based models is that 
they cannot analyze the dynamic, emergent behavior of guerilla warfare.  
Furthermore, the non-linear nature of equations describing many real-
world phenomena makes equation-based models extremely sensitive to 
initial conditions. [Ref 6]  
This means that small changes in determining initial conditions can produce totally 
different outcomes.  This is a serious challenge to conventional models.  
In the following section, the useful features and the relative advantages of agent-
based models are discussed.   
An agent is an object or an entity that can act with its own set of rules.  An 
agent-based simulation is a model that consists of those agents.  [Ref 7]  
As mentioned earlier, conventional models fail to explain all of the real-world 
phenomena. The ability to consider emotional behavior is probably the principal 
advantage of agent-based simulations.  Even though no quantitative data exist to 
represent these intangibles (aggressiveness, fear, courage, leadership, cohesion, 
discipline or morale) agent-based models give the analyst the opportunity to explore 
different alternatives. 
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. 
- Albert Einstein 
4 
While one considers the necessary details of combat, military plans should be 
simple enough to be understood and applied by the practitioners of combat.  The same 
rules apply to the world of simulation.  Models should contain the essence of the situation 
and disregard the unnecessary details to avoid overwhelming the computer or the user.  In 
this sense agent-based models are good tools to use; they are fairly simple and easy to set 
up.  While it takes months to build a scenario in traditional constructive models, just days 
or weeks are needed for the same process with agent-based models.  Furthermore, a 
simple model leads to fast runs.  Hundreds of thousands of runs can be done in twenty-
four hours with an agent-based model.  This attribute provides the analyst or the modeler 
the opportunity to run the simulation with many different alternatives.  This is in contrast 
to conventional large-scale models, which usually enable the analyst to consider only a 
few alternatives due to slow runs and complex modeling. 
Entities in traditional constructive models are often pre-programmed, and they act 
perfectly.  But systems in the real world may not ever work or act properly; they can 
diverge from their usual attitude.  In real-world combat, sometimes soldiers, due to a host 
of reasons, may not obey their orders or may accidentally kill their own comrades in a 
conflict. Accidental fratricide is a reality recognized by military doctrine, and it is an 
example indicating that systems do not always act perfectly.  Such an idea can be 
modeled with agent-based models, as the autonomous characteristic of agents allows one 
to model entities that can make mistakes, or make wrong decisions or can accidentally 
kill their comrades. 
The emergent behavior of real-world situations can be modeled with agent-based 
models.  Agents interact with their local environment, with the enemy, and with the 
friendly troops.  Owing to their situational awareness capability, agents can sense and 
adapt to their local environment and act accordingly. 
Although agent-based models are useful tools to explore small-scale situations, 
they have some limitations.  For instance, they can’t be used for prediction or used to 
model large-scale real-world situations.  Another major challenge for agent-based models 
is the difficulty of representing intangibles as numerical data. 
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1. Why MANA?  
MANA builds on and complements the earlier ISAAC/EINSTEIN 
Cellular Automata (CA) models developed by the Center for Naval 
Analyses, and the now discontinued Archimedes models that were 
designed for the Marine Corps.  MANA’s primary use is a “distillation” 
tool.  That is, it creates a bottom-up abstraction of a scenario that captures 
just the essence of a situation, but avoids the unessential detail. MANA 
was designed to explore key concepts that ISAAC (at that time) was 
unable to explore. In particular: [Ref 6] 
• Situational Awareness: A group memory of enemy contacts.  Two types 
of situational awareness maps are provided in MANA:  a squad map 
which holds direct squad contact memory and an inorganic map that stores 
contact memories provided by other squads through communications 
links. [Ref 6] 
• Communications: Allows communication of contact sightings between 
squads.  An extensive range of parameters allows issues involving 
communications links to be thoroughly explored. [Ref 6] 
• Terrain Map: Contains terrain features such as roads that agents can 
follow and undergrowth that agents can use for concealment. 
• Waypoints: Can define a set of waypoints, not just an ultimate 
destination. [Ref 6] 
• Event-driven personality changes: Events such as being shot at; taking a 
shot, reaching a waypoint, making enemy contact can all trigger a 
different personality set, which lasts for a certain time.  Personality 
changes can be for individuals or for a whole squad at once. [Ref 6] 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN WARFARE 
This chapter details the characteristics of urban warfare and the similarities 
between villages and urban areas.  Due to its unique conditions, combat in urban areas 
can result in massive casualties for both the attacker and defenders.  In order to reduce 
collateral damage, firepower might be restricted in populated areas.  Another factor 
restricting urban operations is the presence of civilians in the area.  The necessity to 
provide life support and other essential services to civilians can require the allocation of a 
large number of manpower and equipment for this purpose.  A hostile population can 
strongly affect the mission accomplishment by different means (passing information, 
providing shelter to the enemy, and so on).  Success in such an area might be defined as 
accomplishing the mission while minimizing possible civilian casualties and 
environmental damage.  Initially, the defender has a tactical advantage over the attacker, 
as he knows the terrain.  However, in the following phases of the battle, the advantage of 
mobility, cover, and observation can be shared evenly.  Also, surprise can go to attacker 
in search operations.  This section discusses some of the unique characteristics of urban 
warfare. [Ref 8] 
The battlefield for urban operations consists of a mix of natural and man-made 
features, which distinguish it from all other kinds of terrain (e.g., forest, jungles, or 
deserts).  The commander can encounter open and covered areas in the urban terrain and 
areas where these coexist.  The battlefield in an urban area merits a detailed analysis 
because of its effect on the tactics and procedures employed by the unit.  The use of 
armored vehicles in such an environment requires close coordination with infantry units.  
While increasing the cover and concealment capability, the urban areas decrease 
firepower and the lines of sight.  The defender can use the features that restrict firepower 
and visibility to create an area that the attacker desires to avoid. 
In addition to fighting on the ground level, urban combat operations may also be 
conducted on roofs, from buildings, sewer systems, in subways, and other underground 
facilities.  Providing increased concealment and cover for the defenders, this feature may  
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result in severe casualties and material destruction for the attackers in the initial phases of 
the battle.  When visibility is diminished, the need for automatic weapons, hand grenades, 
and high explosives increases. 
An effective communication network is crucial either for the defender or the 
attacker to achieve a successful operation.  However, in urban areas, the communication 
network can be seriously affected.   
In possibly no other form of combat are the pressures of battle 
more intense. Continuous close combat, high casualties, the fleeting nature 
of targets, and fires from a frequently unseen enemy produce severe 
psychological strain and physical fatigue—particularly among small-unit 
leaders and soldiers. [Ref 8] 
The complexity of the terrain and the existence of civilians tend to reduce the 
effectiveness of standard military tactics.  These operations require a different tactical use 
of military units. Generally, small units with decentralized command and control 
networks are the essence of combat operations in an urban area. 
Except for the presence of high buildings, villages are very similar to the urban 
area in respect to military operations. The presence of civilians, the cover and 
concealment factor, the necessity to use small units, the composition of the terrain that 
mixes natural and man-made features, fewer observational areas, and the need to use light 
infantry arms are all also characteristics of village search operations.  Therefore, in terms 
of basic military tactics, operations conducted in villages are similar to those conducted 
in urban areas. 
A. SEARCH OPERATIONS IN BUILT UP AREAS 
Search operations in populated areas are either conducted by military forces or by 
police forces.  The operations might comprise just a few cottages or a densely populated 
area.  For both areas, special units must be employed.  Methods for search operations are 
represented in the field manual as: [Ref 9] 
• Search units consist of three elements: (1) The search element responsible 
for conducting the search.  (2) The security element that encloses the area 
to prevent any entrance or exit and to secure the area for the search unit.  
(3) The reserve unit (a mobile unit maintained in a nearby area) that is 
usually kept for flexibility purposes and employed when required. 
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• The search element itself is divided into different components and 
while conducting the search it has a special team for its close 
security.  
• The security element encircles the area to prevent any 
reinforcements from entering or exiting.  After the security 
elements surround the area, the search element enters the region to 
conduct the search.  All potential exits that could be used by the 
evaders must be cut-off by the security element.  Those potential 
areas could be subsurface routes, such as subways and sewers for 
urban areas, and tracks/caches or tunnels for villages.  
• Upon the decision of the commander, the reserve element can be 
assigned to reinforce or to replace any of the other two elements if 
they meet resistance that they cannot overcome. 
• A component of the environment that should be taken into consideration is 
the population.  In counter-guerrilla operations, the support of the 
population is extremely important to the security forces.  So, the search 
operation should be conducted in a way that causes limited disturbance to 
the population.  The amount of disturbance should encourage the local 
population to pressure the guerrillas to retreat from the area, but the 
disturbance should not encourage the population to help the guerillas.  For 
success, the search plan must be executed swiftly and simply. 
B. EXAMPLES OF RECENT SEARCH OPERATIONS 
This section gives recent examples of search operations and an insight about the 
benefit of using the agent-based model MANA in search operations.  The first example is 
the capture of the former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who was captured during a search 
operation conducted by the coalition forces. The New Zealand Army in East Timor 
conducted the second search operation.  Before this operation, the New Zealand’s DTA 
conducted a study involving different tactics that could be used. 
1. Capture of Saddam Hussein 
The capture of Saddam Hussein is one of the recent search operations conducted 
by the coalition forces in Iraq.  The following are press releases from the Headquarters of 
the United States Central Command.  Figure 3 and Figure 4 display the area where 
Saddam Hussein was found. 
Forces from the 4th Infantry Division, coalition forces and special 
operations forces captured former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, at 
approximately 8 p.m. local time on the fourteenth of December 2003 in a 
remote farm house near Tikrit, Iraq.  Operation ‘Red Dawn’ was launched 
after gaining actionable intelligence identifying two likely locations near 
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the town of Ad Dwar.  The First Brigade Combat team of the 4th ID was 
assigned the mission to capture or kill Saddam Hussein.  The forces 
involved in the operation consisted of approximately 600 soldiers 
including cavalry, artillery, aviation, engineer and special operations 
forces.  The forces cleared the two objectives, but initially did not locate 
their target.  An additional suspicious site was identified and searched.  
The area was a small, walled, mud hut compound with a metal lean-to 
structure.  Within the structure a ‘spider hole’ entrance, camouflaged with 
bricks and dirt was located.  The hole was about 6 to 8 feet deep with 
space allowing an individual to lie down. Saddam Hussein was found 
hiding at the bottom of the hole.  He was captured without resistance and 
is in the control of coalition forces at an undisclosed location. Items 
confiscated during the raid include two AK-47 rifles, a pistol, $750,000.00 
U.S. dollars and one taxi.  Two other individuals who have not been 
identified were also detained. [Ref 10] 
A similar situation is modeled in this study.  Terrorists hidden in a cache will 
likely try to protect themselves and this fact presents a danger to a search operation.  This 
is similar to a Turkish operation against the terrorist organization, KADEK, which has 
been responsible for numerous casualties. 
 
Figure 3.   The Area of the Search Operation for Saddam Hussein 
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Figure 4.   The Area of the Search Operation for Saddam Hussein 
 
2. An Application of the MANA Model to Operations in East Timor 
A motivation for this thesis is a study done for the New Zealand Army, using the 
model MANA, of a village search operation.  This section provides an example of a real-
world situation implemented previously in MANA.  The model was based on two 
operational questions: (1) What is the most effective way to conduct a search operation? 
(2) Is it possible to show the benefits of the use of tracks?  [Ref 4]  Those questions were 
asked by the BATT6 CO, Lt. Col Dean Baigent, who was concerned that the use of 
conventional search techniques would not be appropriate for the East Timor theatre. 
Conventional search techniques (described in the previous section) suggest the 
use of an inner and outer cordon.  But, Lt Col Dean Baigent was concerned that the time 
and commotion required for human traffic and dogs to infiltrate an inner cordon would 
alert the target.  Thus, the target could escape from the inner cordon.  Once the inner 
cordon is avoided, it is extremely difficult to capture the target, as the area between the 
inner and outer cordon is very large.  Additionally, the size of the area makes it 
impossible to implement a full outer cordon, due to a lack of resources.  Lt. Col Dean 
Baigent identified MANA as a useful tool in exploring the possible different techniques 
for the search operation.  Finally, the models were built for different scenarios and the 




• The speed at which an inner cordon is inserted is critical to the success of 
the cordon and search mission. 
• Blocking tactics were superior to chasing tactics for catching belligerent 
infiltrators. 
The BATT6 conducted two cordon operations following the completion of the 
models.  Although there was a long time between the modeling and the search operations, 
and although the models were not intended to explore all of the aspects of the operations, 
comments from the CO and other staff revealed that the exercise of setting the scenarios 
in MANA was highly beneficial, and the study amplified their confidence in the methods 
that were actually used. 
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III. SCENARIOS AND MODEL DESCRIPTION  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the modeling of the scenarios built for this thesis, focuses 
on key features of the agent-based model MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata), 
and explains the measures of effectiveness and the sixteen factors defined for the analysis 
of the baseline scenario.  Five different scenarios are built in order to answer the four 
operational questions mentioned previously.  Company size commando units are 
employed in all five scenarios. 
B. SCENARIOS 
The first two scenarios intend to explore the following factor: the effect of the 
proficiency level of the troops on the outcome of a possible skirmish in a search 
operation.  The third scenario examines the benefits of having village guards in a search 
operation.  The objective of the fourth scenario is to explain the effects of a hostile 
environment on the outcome of a search operation.  The fifth scenario is modeled to find 
how effective a reserve unit is in a village search operation. 
1. Baseline Scenario 
To search the village and capture the terrorists, an outer cordon is placed around 
the village and then an inner cordon is inserted.  The third step is to send the search 
element in the village.  Unlike a conventional search operation, in this scenario the outer 
cordon is placed 1500 meters away from the village.  The reason for placing the security 
element far away from the village is the fear that dogs, which would alert the terrorists, 
might detect the soldiers.  The drawback of placing the troops far from the village is the 
impossibility of forming a full cordon.  The lack of resources forces the commando unit 
to set up a partial cordon focused on blocking the tracks that are in the areas believed 
most likely to be used by the terrorists. 
In the first two scenarios the villagers are not sympathetic to the terrorist group. 
This means that the villagers will not pass any information to the Red agents (terrorists).  
The operation starts at 1 AM and lasts around three hours; just a few local people are 
awake at that time. 
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The actions follow this sequence:  a company size unit approaches the village by 
foot using the road and forms an outer cordon.  Then, two sniper teams sneak into two 
observational points approximately three to four hundred meters from the village.  
Finally, the search team divides into two components and is inserted following the roads 
from the north and from the south.  The terrorists are probably in the village for 
propaganda, food or money.  The terrorists do not want to take any risks, so they will try 
to evade as soon as they obtain any information of an imminent threat.  The dogs, which 
realize the trucks are coming, will bark and this will be the information about possible 
danger that is passed to the terrorists. 
MANA allows modeling this via the ‘interactions’ feature.  This feature 
enables a model entity to trigger a change in the state of another entity 
within a certain range.  In this case, the change in the state indicates that 
information has been passed. [Ref 4] 
A map of the village was adapted for use by DTA (New Zealand’s Defense 
Technology Agency) in the model using color codes.  An elevation map is created using 
Photoshop.  Altitudes in MANA can be defined via the different tones of the 256 colors 
on the grey scale, each tone represents 10 meters.  The elevation for each hundred meters 
is coded in this map. Entities are used to represent dogs (green), villagers (yellow), 
terrorists (red) and soldiers (blue), see Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   A Snapshot of the Baseline Scenario 
 
2. Key Scenario Assumptions 
• The terrorists will run away from the soldiers, and desire to follow tracks 
and creeks in order to escape.  However, they will not surrender—which 
means that they will fight if they cannot run away. 
• Troops on the ground that do not carry NVGs (Night Vision Goggles) 
have a visibility of 80 meters.  The troops carrying NVGs have a visibility 
of 200 to 600 meters, depending on the capability of the NVGs used.  The 
troops that are positioned on the outer cordon and do not have NVGs have 
a detection capability of 100 meters.  This superiority is given to these 
troops because of their positions. 
• The terrorists are assumed to have NVGs, but they are incapable of 
hooking them up to their rifles.  They have the same firing range as the 
troops but are considered to be more experienced than conscripts, so they 
have a higher single-shot kill probability. 
• The dogs are aroused as soon as the trucks are within a range of 700 
meters of the village. 
• The snipers are not detected. 
• The troops are able to dismount the trucks as soon as they reach their final 
waypoint (an area close to the village). 
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The terrorists are familiar with the area, so they have a higher speed than the conscripts.  
The speed of the terrorists is 3 kilometers per hour (km/h) and the speed of the conscripts 
is 2.77 km/h (this is not the case for professionals) 
3. Professional Soldiers 
A company size professional unit is employed for the mission.  The same 
procedure described in the previous scenario follows. 
• Assumptions 
• Professionals have the same speed as the terrorists.  That is, they 
have a speed of 3 km/h. 
• Being better trained, the professional’s stealth values are 10 
percent higher than the conscript’s stealth values.  This means that 
it is more difficult to detect them. 
• Professionals have a higher single-shot kill probability than 
conscripts; for the range defined, depending on the arms that the 
soldier uses, a professional’s single-shot kill probability is at least 
10 percent higher than the conscript’s.   
• Professionals have better equipment than conscripts, so they tend 
to have higher detection ranges and probabilities.4 
4. Village Guards 
The Turkish government in its fight against terrorism employs village guards. 
These are people that voluntarily protect their village against terrorists.  The guards are 
provided small arms and some equipment to accomplish their mission.  An area of 
interest in this study is to see how effective the village guards are in a search operation 
area, if a skirmish occurs. 
Village guards are represented with entities of the color purple.  They have a high 
stealth parameter initially, which means that they will not be detected most of the time.  
Their primary mission is to observe the terrorist activities in the village and pass the 
information to the security forces.  Having been provided NVGs, they have a 150-meter 
range of visibility.  Except for self-protection, village guards will not engage in a fight 
with the terrorists.  When security forces arrive at the village, the guards will join them 
and attend the rest of the operation with the troops.  It is assumed that the dogs are 
familiar to the guards, and their presence will not be revealed. 
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5. Hostile Village  
This scenario examines the case in which the villagers are sympathetic to the 
terrorist group.  The contribution of the local people to the guerilla forces can be 
providing food, money, shelter, members and information.  Villagers represented with 
yellow agents in the model pass information about the approach of strangers to the 
terrorists, in addition to the dogs.  As soon as the terrorists receive the information, they 
seek refuge.  In this case the refuge will be a cache.  It is assumed that some villagers 
have underground tunnels and caches in their house.  The problems for the security forces 
in such cases are (1) It is difficult to find the terrorists; (2) The security forces become 
very vulnerable to close fires.  Any skirmish occurring in these conditions might cause 
severe casualties to the troops.  MANA allows modeling such cases by its “interaction” 
and “terrain” features.  The principle for the interaction feature was described previously 
in this chapter.  The terrain in MANA is modeled by color codes.  Each color code has 
three factors scaled from 0.00 to 1.00.  The first one is “going.”  A value of 0.00 means 
the terrain is impassable; a terrain of 0.50 means that the terrain is passable but affects the 
movement of the entity reducing its speed by 50 percent, and a terrain with a value of 
1.00 can be crossed without any difficulties.  The second factor is “cover.” A cover value 
of 1.00 means that the area protects entities from being killed, and a value of 0.00, means 
that no cover is provided at all.  For a cover value between zero and one there is a 
corresponding probability of killing the agent.  The third factor is concealment.  
Concealment affects the visibility.  A value of 1.00 for the concealment factor means that 
it is impossible to detect the entities in this area.  For a value of 0.00, the concealment is 
taken together with the stealth factor of any entity to decide whether it is detected or not.  
When the concealment takes a value between 0.00 and 1.00, a random test reveals 
whether a grid square can be seen through on each time step.  For any of this parameter 
there is a percentage reduction if the number is defined between zero and one.  For 
example, a cover of 0.50 means that this area provides 50 percent less cover than an area 
that has a cover of 1.00.  Areas with high cover values are very attractive for an agent 
seeking refuge.  This is the case in this scenario.  The Red agents will move toward the  
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area with high cover value, which represents a cache constructed in some of the houses of 
the village.  It is assumed that terrorists who entered the cache will have a lower visibility 
and firing range. 
6. Reserve Unit 
Conventional techniques of a search operation require the use of a reserve unit in 
search operations to assist either the search element or the security element when needed.  
This scenario is built to see the effects of maintaining a reserve element when a cordon 
and search procedure is implemented.  The reserve unit is carried by a helicopter, and 
initially will have an aerial observation task.  The reserve forces would be dismounted 
either when the helicopter detects Red agents or when a friendly unit sends information 
declaring the presence of Red agents.  The reserve team will be dismounted in an area 
nearby the contact. 
• Assumptions: 
• The pilot has a depth perception of 500 feet.  The reserve element 
is provided high capacity NVGs.  Thus, any entity within a range 
of 500 meters will be detected. 
• The troops will dismount the helicopter within thirty seconds. 
• All soldiers are provided NVGs and have a visibility range of 200 
meters. 
C. HISTORY AND KEY CONCEPTS OF THE MODEL (MANA) 
This section intends to provide additional information about the model used in 
this study and refers to the history and some key features of the model based on [Ref 6]. 
1. History 
In 1999, DTA was using two automaton models, ISAAC and EINSTein [Ref 12], 
developed by Andy Illachinsky to do some exploratory analysis.  The idea of replacing 
the conventional models with these automaton models created the necessity to improve 
certain aspects of these models.  Then, in early 2000, DTA began to use the program 
MATLAB to introduce the idea of “Situational Awareness.”  But MATLAB did not 
provide the needed flexibility for this concept.  The idea of using an object-oriented 
program emerged, and Delphi Object Pascal language was chosen to serve this purpose.  
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In the early stages of its creation MANA and ISAAC had similar concepts, but several 
new features have been improved in MANA.  The following section presents the key 
features of MANA. 
2. Key Concepts 
2.1  Squads:  A squad is a set of agents that can vary in size from 1 to a 1000. 
[Ref 6]  Once a squad is defined all agents in the squad have the same properties.  A 
transition between states (The properties of the current behaviors defined by a set of 
parameters) can be done either individually or as groups.  In addition to having common 
properties agents share the same situational awareness map. 
2.2  Battlefield Object:  A battlefield of 200 by 200 cells is created by default.  
The size of the map can be extended to 1,000 by 1,000 cells.  Each cell can be occupied 
by a single entity unless modified to allow multiple agents in a cell.  No agents can cross 
the border of the Battlefield boundaries.  The following types of cells can be created in 
MANA: 
2.2.1  Billiard Table:  This is the basic terrain that has no properties and does not 
affect the behavior of the entities.  These cells cannot be modified.  
2.2.2  Easy Going:  This is the terrain preferable to the agent’s movement.  
Entities that desire moving easily will prefer these areas.  Yellow is the color code for 
easily passable terrain.  Areas around this color must affect the movement of the agents in 
order to make them undesirable. 
2.2.3  Wall:  The color grey is used to create walls.  A wall is an area that cannot 
be occupied by agents.  
2.2.4  Light/Dense Bush:  The color green and its tones represent light or dense 
areas.  The density level of the area affects the movement, cover, and concealment factors 
of the entities in the model. 




A standard Windows bitmap is used to set up the area.  Additionally, a 
background can be created for explanatory or decorative purpose.  A background 
reflecting the properties of the battlefield is useful in making the situation more 
comprehensible. 
2.3  Squad SA Map (Situational Awareness Map) Object:  When a squad member 
detects an entity using its sensors, it sends this information to the squad situational 
awareness map, see Figure 6, which is a platform where entities are in pictorial forms.  
The other members of the same squad can share this information as they use the same 
platform as their squad SA map.  Choosing the organic situational awareness option in 
the view menu, one can see the map where the information is collected and shared.  
Types of icons to represent entities, threat level association and cluster targets are the 
options on the squad SA map.  The arrow on the bottom allows displaying the squad SA 
map for different squads.  In the squad SA map, inverted triangles represent friends, non-
inverted triangles are other friendly squads, and diamonds indicate neutrals.  Enemies are 
shown as Red boxes, unknown (entities detected but not classified) as white boxes, and 
cluster targets as pink circles. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Squad Situational Awareness 
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Threat persistence is the parameter that defines the time period each entity will be 
displayed on the SA map.  As soon as the time period is exhausted and no new detection 
has occurred, the icon representing this entity disappears from the squad SA map. 
The inorganic situational awareness map shows information about the entities 
detected by other squads and is similar to the squad SA map, with the exception that on 
the inorganic situational awareness map, the “Show Squad Option” is removed. 
Agent Object:  Owing to the situational awareness property of MANA, the agent 
object can sense its environment, it knows where it is, it can instinctively move toward 
and away from other entities, and it can pass the information about its location and the 
location of other objects that it detects to other specified squads.  An agent object can 
perform some state changes if some conditions are met.  Weightings can define the traits 
of the agent object.  See [Ref 6] for a detailed discussion on inducing different behaviors 
by selections of weights. 
2.5  Movement:  Movement is the most important activity of a MANA agent.  The 
agent checks all grid squares that are within its movement range and selects the one that 
best fulfills its desire to move toward or away from other entities.  The agent also 
considers its current location; it can also prefer to stay there.  The following steps 
describe the movement algorithm: 
2.5.1  The agent considers all of the movement possibilities within its movement 
range. 
2.5.2  It considers the locations where no other entities are present.  
2.5.3  Among the possible locations, it selects the one that it is allowed and that 
most fulfills its desire according to its personality weights. 
2.5.4  If some modifiers like cluster constraint, combat constraint, minimum 
distance are defined, then the agent acts accordingly.  If it has several movement choices 
that are of equal desirability, it randomly selects one. 
2.5.5  The Penalty Calculation:  The penalty calculation finds the move 
with the least ‘penalty.’  Moves are possible to grid squares within 
‘movement speed’ squares of the current location and not already 
occupied by an agent or impassable terrain. [Ref 6] 
21 
If several moves have a similarly low penalty, a move is chosen at random 
from the good moves.  The ‘movement precision’ parameter sets how 
wide the margin should be for accepting similarly good moves.  Setting 
the movement precision to a low value will mean that most often only the 
best move will be chosen and the movement will appear very 
deterministic.  If the movement precision is too great, the agents tend to 
wander about in a Brownian motion, as moves are selected at random.  
[Ref 6] 
The tendency of agents to move toward or away from other objects is independent 
of the distance.  It does not make any difference to the agents whether the object is 100 
meters away or 200 meters away from him, unless the entities are included in the penalty 
calculation.  When this is the case, closer entities are given higher weighting than others.  
The penalty to move to any grid location is the sum of 27 penalty calculations, 
corresponding to the 27 personality parameters listed in Table 1 in Appendix A. The 

















where M is the number of entities whose distance from the agent is to be 
used in the weighting equation;  DN and DO are the new and old distances 
respectively from the agent to each entity; and DW is a weighting factor 
that by: [Ref 6] 
Dw = Round (BDL - D 0 ), 
where BDL is the length of the diagonal of the Battlefield.  Dw assigns a 
higher value to the entities closer to the agents over those that are found 
farther.  The reason for including the diagonal length is to ensure that the 
scale of different scenarios does not affect the calculation. [Ref 6] 
The penalty for moving towards or away from other agents is normalized 
by the number of agents weighted in proportion to their distance from the 
agent (it is assumed that all agents occur in close proximity).  For 
example, if an agent is attracted to friendly agents, it seeks to minimize its 
weighted average distance to friendly agents within its sensor range.  
However, a number of constraints can modify this attraction. The 
minimum application and maximum influence distances sets a defined 
area about the agent in which the penalty calculation is made–entities from 
outside that area are not included in the penalty calculation. [Ref 6] 
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2.5.6 Cluster Constraints:  Cluster constraint is a feature in MANA that prevents 
agents with the same allegiance from clustering over a specified number.  When an agent 
intends to move, the friend’s penalty component of the movement is calculated.  If the 
number of friendly agents in an area within the sensor range is found to be greater than 
the cluster constraint, then the friend’s penalty is counted and if not it is ignored.  
2.5.7 Combat Constraints:  The combat constraint prevents the agents with the 
same squad to move towards the enemy without a certain numerical advantage.  The 
numerical advantage is obtained by subtracting the number of enemies from the number 
of agents in the same squad.  Note that the number of friendly agents in other friendly 
squads is not considered. 
2.5.8 Advance Constraint:  The advance constraint prevents one from moving 
toward the next waypoint (goal) unless the number of friendly agents reaches a specified 
numbers.  The movement can occur only if the number of the agents within the sensor 
range is over a specified number. 
2.6  Random Numbers:  The random numbers generated in MANA are 
obtained using the built-in Delphi function ‘Random’.  Delphi uses a 
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) with a cycle of 232.  It 
maintains a 32 bit seed, which is treated as an unsigned integer.  The result 
can take on approximately 4.3 x 109 values (232) before repeating the 
cycle. [Ref 6] 
When the MANA application is started, the Delphi function Randomize is 
called which sets the random number generator with a random seed 
obtained from the system clock.  The Random function is used many times 
during a MANA model execution.  For example:  in determining moving 
and firing order, for stealth calculations, deciding the best of similarly 
good agent moves, when getting shot (SSKP), and when placing agents at 
the start of a run. [Ref 6] 
In the MANA source code, the Random function is normally called to 
return an integer number in a certain range.  A typical example would be 
the firepower calculation. In the agent ‘get shot’ function, a random 
number between 0 and 100 is calculated.  If this number is less than the 
SSKP (an integer between 0 and 100) of the enemy agent who shot, then 
the receiving agent is hit.  As one would expect, a high SSKP (close to 
100) results in receiving agents being shot most of the time. [Ref 6] 
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D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOES) 
Most of the time, for a commander, a successful mission accomplishment in a 
village search operation means maximizing the number of Red casualties while 
minimizing the casualties of his own forces.  For this reason, in this study two primary 
measures of effectiveness are chosen: the mean Blue and the mean Red casualties.  
Although these measures can represent the goal of a commander in a search operation, 
they were insufficient for comparing the five scenarios.  Therefore, a third measure of 
effectiveness, the ratio of mean Blue to mean Red casualties (also known as the exchange 
ratio), is introduced to fulfill this deficiency. 
1. Mean Blue Casualties (MOE 1) 
The purpose of defining this MOE is to compare the five scenarios from the Blue 
losses aspect.  This also forms the response variable for the data set and is used to explore 
the significance of the sixteen factors—that is, what factors affect Blue losses. 
2. Mean Red Casualties (MOE 2) 
This MOE provides a measure to compare the five scenarios from the Red losses 
aspect.  This is also used in the data set to explore the effects of the sixteen factors.   
3. The Ratio of Mean Blue Casualties to Mean Red Casualties (MOE 3) 
This MOE is introduced for a special case.  MOE 1 and MOE 2 provide the 
necessary information in most of the comparisons, but when we were comparing the 
baseline scenario and the scenario with the reserve unit, we were unable to favor one of 
the scenarios with these MOEs.  Thus, we decided that the ratio of mean Blue casualties 
to mean Red casualties would be a good measure of effectiveness to use.  This helps us 
reach a conclusion for the comparison. 
E. THE SIXTEEN FACTORS DEFINED FOR THE ANALYSIS 
Below are the sixteen factors that we use in the analysis.  The original names of 
the factors are given in parentheses.  New names are defined to obtain a better pictorial 
form with the plots. 
1. Ter_OC3_EasTer (Terrain):  In the scenarios it is assumed that the 
terrorists will follow tracks in order to escape from the security forces.  In 
MANA, agents tend to follow easily passable terrains, and the tracks are 
defined as “easy terrain.”  The reason for defining this factor is to explore 
the effect of this assumption on the outcome of the search operation.  In 
other words, what if the terrorists do not prefer to follow these terrains? 
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2. Ter_OC3_InjFr (Injured Friends):  This factor defines the willingness of 
the terrorists to help their injured friends.   
3. Ter_OC3_sskp (Single-Shot Probability of Kill):  This factor is defined to 
find the effects of the single-shot kill probability of the terrorists on the 
outcome. 
4. Ter_OC3_Stealth (Stealth):  This parameter is defined to find how the 
stealth of a terrorist affects the outcome.  The stealth parameter in MANA 
represents the difficulty of detecting an entity by another one when it 
enters its sensor range.  A stealth value of 100 means that the entity is 
invisible. Conversely, a stealth value of 0 does not affect the visibility of 
the entity at all. [Ref 6] 
5. Ter_OC3_OT3 (Enemy Threat3):  This factor defines the propensity of the 
terrorists to move toward or move away from the security forces.  We 
want to explore the effect of the aggressiveness of the terrorists. 
6. Ter_OC3_SR (Sensor Range):  This parameter varies the terrorist’s ability 
to classify the enemy and examines its importance.  
7. Sniper1Stealth (Stealth):  As mentioned previously, two snipers are 
infiltrated to observational points in the scenarios.  It is assumed that the 
dogs or the villagers do not detect the snipers.  What if one of the snipers 
was not careful enough and was detected?  The goal of defining this factor 
is to look at how the individual mistakes of a sniper affect the outcomes. 
8. SearchT_FWP_Stealth (Stealth):  One of the most vulnerable moments of 
a search team in a real-world situation is when they dismount the vehicles 
after reaching the final destination.  This factor is described to find the 
affect of varying the stealth value of the search team when it reaches the 
village and dismounts the vehicles. 
9. SearchT_OC3_Stealth (Stealth):  This factor intends to explore the effect 
of the stealth parameter for the search team while conducting the search 
operation.  The point is to find how much better the search team would do 
with higher stealth values or vice versa. 
10. SearchT_MSpeed (Movement Speed):  Speed is very important in search 
operations.  Research has shown that a high speed is usually preferred for 
a search operation.  Then, how fast should a search team be for a search 
operation?  Is there a relationship between the attitude of the terrorists and 
the speed preferred?   
11. SearchT_OC3_OT3 (Enemy Threat 3):  This factor defines the propensity 
of the security forces (the search team) to move toward the terrorists.  
Soldiers may obey or not obey their commander in a military operation, or 
for some reasons the search team may not pursue the terrorists.  The 
questions that arise are what happen if the security forces do not chase the 
terrorists?  Is the cordon tactic enough to capture the terrorists in this case?  
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12. SearchNoNVG_SR (Sensor Range):  This factor varies the sensor range of 
the search team elements that do not carry night-vision goggles.  This 
factor also intends to explore the effects of having a different sensor range. 
13. TC_ComRel (Communication Reliability):  Communication is vital to any 
military operation.  In MANA, a perfect communication network can be 
defined.  But this will not reflect reality.  It is assumed that the elements 
(the search element and the cordon) in the scenarios have perfect inner 
communications.  Defining this factor, we wanted to examine the role of 
communication in a search operation. 
14. SearchT_ITR (Inorganic Threat Rate): The inorganic threat rate is the 
number of time steps that must pass for a threat on the Inorganic 
Situational Awareness map to disappear. [Ref 6]   
An example can explain better: Let’s say that a terrorist is detected by one of the 
cordon’s elements and this information is passed to the search team.  This information 
will appear on the situational awareness map of the search team element.  This 
information will stay on the situational awareness map until the deadline.  If the inorganic 
threat is 30 (the time defined), then the entity will disappear from the inorganic 
situational awareness map in 30 time steps. 
15. SearchT_sskp (single-shot kill probability):  This factor is defined to find 
the effect of the single-shot kill probability of the search team on the 
outcome of the operation. 
16.  SearchT_NT (Non-target Classes):  Due to the presence of civilians in the 
area, urban operations are different from most other military operations.  
Civilians should not be targeted, and this idea somewhat affects the 
firepower of the forces in the area.  In the scenarios, the search operations 
are conducted during the night.  So there are just a few villagers awake at 
that time.  The objective for defining this factor is to find if the presence of 
so many villagers really affects the outcomes. 
This chapter described the five scenarios modeled for this thesis, detailed the key 
features of the agent-based model MANA, the MOEs and the sixteen factors defined for 
the analysis of the baseline scenario.  The next chapter explains the statistical tools and 
techniques we use to explore the models. 
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IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the analysis methodology and the statistical tools used to 
explore the research questions.  The objective of the analysis is to compare the five 
different scenarios described previously and to explore the effect of the sixteen factors 
stated in the previous chapter on the possible outcomes of the village search operation 
scenario in MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata).  We also want to develop 
descriptive and predictive models for the data sets obtained from the MANA application 
of the village search operation.  For these purposes, two different statistical techniques, 
Hypothesis Tests and Regression Trees, are used. 
B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
A statistical hypotheses or hypothesis is a claim about the value of a single 
population characteristic or about the value of several population 
characteristics.  In any hypothesis testing, there are two contradictory 
hypotheses under consideration. One of these hypotheses is initially 
favored.  This initially favored claim will not be rejected in favor of the 
alternative unless sample evidence contradicts it and provides strong 
support for the alternative assertion. [Ref 15] 
In this study, the null hypothesis is the claim that the differences of mean Blue 
and mean Red casualties between the baseline scenario and each of the other scenarios is 
zero.  The alternative assertion is that the difference specified above is not zero, it is 
either greater or less than zero. 
The hypothesis testing procedure that we use requires the assumptions of normal 
distribution and known values of standard deviations for both samples, when sample 
sizes are small.  However, when sample sizes are large, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) 
ensures that the difference between the population means has approximately a normal 
distribution. [Ref 15] In our case, we do not need to make any assumptions.  Because, in 
order to compare the scenarios, 200 replications are made for each scenario and each 
result produced by a replication represents a sample from the population.  This means 
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that the sample size is 200 for each population.  This number is well above the common 
CLT thumb rule, which states that the means of sample sizes over 30 are usually close to 
normally distributed. 
C. THE BOOTSTRAP, A RESAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
From the researchers’ point of view in statistical analysis, a single point estimate 
is usually insufficient for an estimate of a parameter.  For a statistical analysis, usually, 
the standard deviation, the mean and a confidence interval of the true value of a 
parameter are of interest. [Ref 16] 
Most of the techniques used by a researcher to find the standard deviation and a 
confidence interval are based on the CLT and the approximation to the normal 
distribution.  These techniques can be invalid when the distribution of the statistic, or its 
known transformation, is not asymptotically normally distributed.  With the 
computational power gained today, researchers do not need to make such assumptions to 
estimate the distribution of a statistic.  They can use resampling techniques, such as the 
Bootstrap, that can generate estimates of the standard error and confidence intervals on 
most statistics developed by the researchers.  The statistic representing the third MOE in 
this study is an example of a statistic that the Bootstrap can provide inferential results 
when the traditional parametric methods fail. [Ref 16] 
In the Bootstrap, the observations that are in hand are assumed to represent the 
underlying population.  Based on this assumption, each time, a number of samples 
equivalent to the sample size are drawn with replacement from the observed data, 
generating a distribution for the statistic.  In other words, each time the observations are 
drawn with replacement from an observed data set assumed to be the population itself.  In 
the Bootstrap some of the data points appear zero times, some of them appear just once, 
and some appear more than once in each draw. [Ref 17]  This process is replicated “B” 
times (a number specified by the researchers, usually suggested as a thousand).  The 
statistic is calculated for each of the B Bootstrap samples.  The spread indicates the 
variability inherent to the statistic, in our case the exchange ratio. (See S-PLUS 4 Guide 




D. POWER CALCULATION AND SAMPLE SIZE 
The Power calculations determine the necessary sample size for a hypothesis test 
with the sensitivity level desired by the analyst.  Two types of errors can occur in 
hypothesis testing.  A Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis Ho  is rejected, despite 
being true.  A Type II error occurs when  Ho  is false but it is not rejected. [Ref 15]  The 
Type I error is controlled just by defining a significance level ( α ).  The probability that a 
Type II error occurs is β , and 1-β  defines the power of a test.  The power of a 
hypothesis test is the probability of favoring the alternative when it is true by correctly 
rejecting the null hypothesis.  For a fixed α , and a fixed alternative, to increase the 
power (or to decrease the probability of a Type II error) the sample size must be 
increased.  This is because; the power of a test is related to 2 / 2i∑µ σ , where µ  is the set 
of unknown means and  is the variance of the response. [Ref 18]  Power calculations 
are done to determine the sample size that reduces the Type II error to the level desired 
by the analyst.  For this study, the S-PLUS code developed by Lloyd Brown [Ref 18] is 
implemented and the result shown in Figure 7 is obtained.  The y-axis is the number of 
samples and the x-axis is the detectable departure.  
i
2σ
The detectable departure is called τ .  τ   is the degree of sensitivity that 
the analyst wants to incorporate in the hypothesis test, and 2 2i /τ = ∑µ σ . 
[Ref 18] 
The figure shows that a sample size of fifty is large enough for a power of 0.95 to 
catch departures of size .25 (For further details see Brown’s thesis).  
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Figure 7.   Power Curves Determining the Needed Sample Size 
 
The sample size obtained from these power curves helps us to determine the 
number of replications needed for our analysis. 
E. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT AND LATIN HYPERCUBE DESIGNS 
An experimental design is usually necessary when there are several factors to 
explore simultaneously in an analysis.  The following characteristics are the desired 
aspects of an experimental design generating results that can be explored efficiently: [Ref 
19] 
• Approximate orthogonality of the input variables.  The orthogonality 
guarantees independence among the columns (variables) of a design 
matrix. 
• Good space-filling properties.  Good space filling properties are favored 
because they ensure that the design points are distributed throughout the 
entire experimental region.  This also mitigates the model obtained from 
the analysis being overly influenced by unrealistic influential points. 
• Ability to examine the effects of several factors. 
• Simplicity in generating the design.  The simplicity of generating the 
design can be explained better by an example.  Suppose that a design has 
sixteen factors and all of their interaction terms should be tested; though 
only a few are expected to be significant.  In a full factorial design 216 
(65,536) runs must be done.  Even with a half factorial design 215 (32,768) 
runs must be done.  Only 65 runs are needed with near orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube designs.  
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The ease of generating the design, the good space-filling property and the near 
orthogonality provided by the Latin Hypercube designs encouraged us to use them as the 
experiment tool.  Furthermore, we decided to use Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Tom 
Cioppa’s near orthogonal Latin Hypercube designs. [Ref 19] 
In Latin hypercube sampling, the input variables are treated as random 
variables with known distribution functions. For each k input variables, 
labeled Xi, for i=1,2,…,k ‘all portions of [Xi’s] distribution are represented 
by input values’ by dividing its range into ‘n strata of equal marginal 
probability 1/n, and sampling once from each strata.’[Ref 20] For each Xi, 
the n sampled input values are assigned at random to the n cases –with all 
n! possible permutations being equally likely.  This determines the column 
in the design matrix for Xi and is done independently for each of the k 
input variables.  A great strength of the Latin hypercube designs is that 
they are easy to generate for all k and n. [Ref 14] 
Sixteen variables are defined for the exploratory analysis conducted in this thesis.  
For these factors sixty-five design points are generated with Latin hypercube designs and 
for each design point fifty replications are done.  In total, 3,250 replications are done. 
F. REGRESSION TREES 
Regression Trees provide an exploratory tool to discover the organizational aspect 
of a data set.  Tree-based model can be useful in assessing the accuracy of liner 
regression models (linear regression models predict a continuous response, as a linear 
function of predictors) and providing predictions rules and information about a large data 
set [Ref 16].  They can also be used as an alternative to linear regression models.  The 
following are attractive properties of the tree-base regression models: [Ref 21] 
• They are easy to understand. 
• They are invariant to monotonic transformation in the response. 
• They provide a satisfactory treatment of missing values. 
• It is easy to obtain and visualize general interaction forms. 
• They can handle different type of variables simultaneously. 
• They can be used as a predictive tool. 
The basic principle of tree models is to partition the data set into binary 
homogenous nodes.  The algorithm recursively splits the nodes, either until the nodes  
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reach a certain purity measure or until only a few observations remain in each node.  In 
S-PLUS the purity measure is defined as ( )( )2iy ybar∑ − , where y is the response 
variable for i=1,2,3,…n and ybar is the mean of the response variables. 
For example, let’s say that we want to predict the wages of people according to 
their age, education, sex, race, etc.  Let y be the wage, which is the response.  Initially, we 
have a cell that contains all of the y’s.  The purity which is usually the deviance 
 of this cell is measured.  The observations may be divided according to 
sex.  Men may receive a higher wage than women, or vice versa.  At this stage, the purity 
is measured again for this specific cell.  Another split can occur for education.  Men with 
a certain level of education may receive a higher wage.  The process follows the same 
steps until a certain purity measure is reached or the number of observations in a node is 
sufficiently small. (See [Ref 21]) 
(( 2iy ybar∑ − ) )
G. STATISTICAL TOOLS USED IN THIS STUDY 
1. S-PLUS 
S-PLUS is a statistical software package used for data analysis.  S-PLUS provides 
a large range of modeling techniques, the ability to view, organize, and edit data, and the 
ease of specifying a model to explore the data and do an the analysis.  The attractive 
properties of S-PLUS are: [Ref 16] 
• Import and edit data sets obtained from many sources. 
• Visualization techniques including three-dimensional graphics reveal the 
complex relationships in a data set. 
• The ease provided by the graphical user interface (GUI) allows using 
complex modeling techniques without writing any code. 
• The ability to define functions. 
We found S-PLUS useful for this study as a visualization and a modeling tool.  In 
this study, S-PLUS is used for hypothesis tests, regression tree models and 
Bootstrapping. 
2. JMP (JUMP) 
JMP is the name of a statistical software package that is very easy to use.  JMP 
provides a point-and-click method of analysis.  The analyst does not need to learn the 
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details of JMP scripting language.  He can learn how to use JMP in three or four hours 
and benefit from the various statistical abilities provided by JMP.  With the ease provided 
by JMP, the researcher can focus on the analysis rather than the tool.  Some of the 
attractive characteristics of JMP are:  [Ref 22] 
• JMP provides interactive graphical techniques that allow the analyst to 
explore and uncover the structure of the data. 
• Makes it easy to understand the characteristics of the data set by its 
visualization tools. 
• Allows grouping, editing and viewing data sets. 
• Helps the researcher find patterns in the data set. 
• Fits models according to the types of the variables. 
JMP is designed for both a beginning statistician to do simple statistical analysis 
and for an advanced researcher to perform complex statistical analysis. 
This chapter described the analysis tools and the methods used to do the analysis.  
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V. RESULTS  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the results obtained from the analysis of the data set as well 
as the results obtained from the comparisons of the five scenarios.  Simple test 
procedures are followed to find whether each of the scenarios is significantly different 
from the baseline scenario.  Classification trees are the primary tool used to analyze the 
data set.  S-PLUS and JMP are the statistical packages used to provide statistical 
estimates of the effects of the variables and the differences in the five scenarios. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE SCENARIO WITH HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
In order to do comparison tests, one should define the null hypothesis, the 
alternative hypothesis and the significance level ( α ) that controls the type I error.  An 
estimate of the variances should be known or estimated.  In the following sections we 
used Large Sample Tests.  When sample sizes are large enough (as a rule of thumb 30 or 
more) no assumptions on the normality of the populations and known variance are 
needed.  The Z-test allows making the comparison in this case. [Ref 15]  The following 
definitions are used in all of the comparisons. 
• X1 is the mean Blue casualties for the baseline scenario and Y1 is the mean 
Blue casualties for the scenario involved in the comparison. 
• X2 is the mean Red casualties for the baseline scenario and Y2 is the mean 
Red casualties for the scenario involved in the comparison. 
• The null hypothesis Ho :  Xi – Yi = 0. 
• An alternative hypothesis is defined for each scenario. 
• The level of significance is α  = 0.05. 
• m1 and m2 are the sample sizes. 
1. Test for the Difference between the Baseline Scenario and the 
Professionals  
This test compares the first two scenarios.  In the first scenario, conscripts 
conduct the search operation.  In the second scenario, professionals conduct the operation 
as they are modeled in MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata).  In the real-world 
environment, professionals are expected to be better trained than conscripts.  In the 
scenario called professionals, in order to model professional soldiers we modified 
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conscripts.  We increased their movement speed, their stealth value and their single-shot 
kill probability by 10 percent.  Due to the difference of equipment, a proportion of the 
professional soldiers also have a higher sensor range.  Since the professionals are 
modeled with these properties, we expect that the outcome of a search operation 
conducted by professional will result in lower Blue casualties and higher Red casualties. 
a. Difference between Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
The bar charts in Figure 8 displays the number of Blue casualties for the 
searches conducted by conscripts (baseline scenario) and by professionals.  The y-axis 
represents the frequency of Blue casualties for the 200 replications made.  The x-axis 
represents the number of casualties.  The bar chart suggests that there is a difference 
between the scenarios in terms of Blue casualties.  It should be noted that around 120 
operations conducted by professionals results in zero casualties, while this number is 80 
for the conscripts.  According to the chart, most of the time operations conducted by 
professionals results in favorable results for the Blue Forces.  A hypothesis test is done to 





















Figure 8.   Comparison of Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
As explained previously, professionals are assumed to be better trained 
and more experienced than conscripts. The result of a search operation conducted by 
professionals would be expected to result in lower Blue casualties than a search 
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conducted by conscripts.  In the hypothesis test, the null hypothesis suggests that there is 
no difference between the two scenarios.  In other words, it states that there is no 
difference between a search conducted by professionals and a search conducted by 
conscripts.  Contrarily, the alternative hypothesis suggests that there is a significant 
difference between the scenarios, and that the difference between the mean Blue 
casualties of these scenarios is greater than zero: 
• Ha : X1 – Y1 > 0    
• X  = 1.3    Y  = 0.75     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s 2x =  2.36       s 2y =  1.485  
• P-value << 0.00001 
As the P-value is close to zero, we strongly reject the null hypothesis and 
decide that a search conducted with professionals would result in lower average Blue 
casualties—at least as we modeled them.  It should also be noted that the conscripts 
suffer on average two times more casualties than the professionals.  We can say that there 
is a significant difference between the two scenarios.  In other words, the proficiency 
level of the soldiers is an important factor in decreasing the number of Blue casualties.   
b. Difference between Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
The chart in Figure 9 shows the number of Red casualties for the searches 
conducted by conscripts and by professionals.  The y-axis represents the frequency of 
Red casualties for the 200 replications made. The x-axis represents the number of 
casualties.  The chart suggests that there is a significant difference between both 
scenarios in terms of Red casualties.  The Professionals are able to eliminate all of the 























Figure 9.   Comparisons of Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
As professionals are assumed to be better trained and more experienced 
than conscripts, a search operation conducted by professionals should result in a higher 
number of Red casualties than a search operation conducted by conscripts. Remember, 
we are assuming that the terrorists will fight or flee, not surrender.  Again, the null 
hypothesis suggests that there is no difference between both scenarios, or assumes that 
there is no difference between a search conducted by professionals and a search 
conducted by conscripts.  Contrarily, the alternative hypothesis suggests that there is a 
significant difference between the scenarios, and the difference between the mean Red 
casualties of these scenarios is less than zero: 
• Ha : X2 – Y2 < 0    
• X  = 2.95    Y  = 3.76     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s 2x   =  0.73       s 2y  = 0.18 
• P-value << 0.00001 
The P-value indicates that the data strongly support the alternative 
hypothesis.  The null hypothesis is rejected.   
Remember that in both scenarios we defined four terrorists.  4 – X  ( X  is 
the mean number of Red casualties for conscripts) is the mean number of terrorists that 
escape the search operations conducted by the conscripts and 4 – Y  (Y  is the mean 
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number of Red casualties for professionals) is the mean number of the terrorists that 
escape from search operations conducted by the professionals.  Notice that the average 
number of terrorists that escape from search operations conducted by conscripts is four 
times higher than the number of terrorists that get away from search operations conducted 
by professionals.  We conclude that the proficiency level of the soldiers affects the 
outcome of search operations in terms of Red casualties.  
In both tests, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis—which claims that the proficiency levels of the soldiers affect the outcomes 
of search operations in terms of Red and Blue casualties.  One can say that obviously 
when soldiers have better equipment and are better trained; any operation conducted by 
these soldiers should have better results.  In fact, we want to emphasize the importance of 
this combination.  We want to show how much better a professional unit can perform.  
The conclusion might be that instead of having a large number of soldiers, it may be 
preferable to have a small number of better-trained and better-equipped units. 
2. Test for Difference between Baseline Scenario and Village Guards  
Village guards are employed in villages to protect their village against terrorists 
and to provide the necessary intelligence to the security forces.  In the scenario the village 
guards are located in an area close to the terrorists.  In the real-world environment this 
can be a house where the village guards can observe terrorists’ activities.  The village 
guards have a visibility of 150 meters, and they are provided radios to send the necessary 
information to the security forces.  The village guards will not engage in a fight with the 
terrorists until the security forces arrive in the village.  As soon as the search unit enters 
the village the village guards will join the search unit and pursue the terrorists.  One 
might expect that when village guards are employed, the result of the search operation 
would decrease the Blue casualties and increase the Red casualties.  When observing the 
scenario, we see that when the village guards pass the information to the Blue forces, the 
Blue forces are alerted and move accordingly.  The Blue forces know where the terrorists 
are (at least the initial location) and focus on the area of detection.  This helps to decrease 




a. Difference between Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
As can be seen in Figure 10, the bar charts comparison indicates a 
significant difference between the two scenarios in terms of Blue casualties.  The y-axis 
represents the frequency of Blue casualties for the 200 replications made.  The x-axis 
represents the number of casualties.  In 150 replications of the Village Guard scenario the 
number of Blue casualties is zero while this number is around 80 for the Baseline 
scenario.  For most of the time, the search operations conducted by conscripts (when 





















Figure 10.   Comparisons of Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
The alternative hypothesis suggests that the employment of village guards 
would be helpful to the security forces and this will decrease the number of the Blue 
casualties.  Then the difference between the mean Blue casualties is greater than zero. 
• Ha :  X1 – Y1 > 0    
• X  = 1.3    Y  = 0.575     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s2x   =  2.36        s2y  = 1.16 
• P-value << 0.00001 
Notice that the mean number or Blue casualties decreases by 226% when 
village guards are employed.  The P-value shown above strongly suggests that there is a 
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significant difference between both scenarios.  In other words, as we modeled them, the 
employment of the village guards provides a valuable help to the security forces in 
decreasing the number of Blue casualties.  The decrease in Blue casualties is because the 
village guards send the information about the location of the terrorists until they lose their 
track. 
b. Difference between Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
Examining Figure 11, we cannot say that there is a significant difference 
between both scenarios in terms of Red casualties.  A hypothesis test is conducted in 



















Figure 11.   Comparisons of Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
The alternative hypothesis suggests that the employment of the village 
guards would increase the number of Red casualties.  Then the difference between both 
scenarios would be less than zero. 
• Ha :  X2 – Y2 > 0    
• X  = 2.95   Y  = 2.81     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s 2x =  0.73        s2y = 0.91 
• P-value = 0.0537 
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In this case we retain the alternative hypothesis, but just barely.  However, 
the difference is not significant.  This means that the employment of the village guards do 
not contribute significantly to increase the number of Red casualties.  This is reasonable 
for this specific scenario, as the village guards mostly do an observational task instead of 
engaging terrorists.  Although the employment of the village guards decreases the Blue 
casualties, it does not increase the Red casualties.  In the baseline scenario, the search 
unit does not know where the terrorists are.  While searching the environment, some of 
the soldiers run into the terrorists—who have higher line of sight or single-shot kill 
probability.  This fact increases the number of Blue casualties.  But, when village guards 
are employed, the Blue forces know for a certain time where the terrorists are, and 
instead of running into them inadvertently they are ready to fight.  Finally, the overall 
evaluation of both scenarios shows that the employment of the village guards would be 
favored, as this decreases the number of Blue casualties. 
3.  Test for Difference between Baseline Scenario and Hostile Village 
An operation in a hostile environment in guerilla warfare would be an enormous 
drawback for the security forces.  A high number of Blue casualties might be expected.   
However, if the terrorists are not willing to fight unless they have to, in other words, they 
prefer to hide or flee if they can, and if there are tunnels or caches in the villages, 
sometimes the security forces might not be able to find any of the terrorists.  In those 
situations, the Blue forces might not suffer any casualties at all.  But, the mission is not 
accomplished either.  In the scenario that we developed, the terrorists do not want to 
fight, they are neither willing to surrender.  They hide in caches built in the houses of the 
sympathetic villagers and receive information from villagers.  As they are in caches, their 
sensor range and firepower are reduced.  However, they can still cause high casualties 
because they can use high explosives (grenades) when discovered. 
a. Difference between Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
The bar chart in Figure 12, details the difference between mean Blue 
casualties of the scenarios.  It can be seen that the search operations conducted in a 
hostile villages result in zero Blue casualties for 90 of the replications made.  This 
number is 70 for Red casualties.  The intersection of these cases gives us important 
information.  We also see that in search operations in hostile environments Blue forces 
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are more likely to suffer high casualties.  In 11 replications of the baseline scenario, the 
Blue forces receives more than five casualties while the number of replications that Blue 
receives more than 5 casualties is 29 for search operations in hostile environment.  This 
same situation occurs in real-world operations if there are caches in the village.  It is very 
difficult to find the terrorists if they hide.  Even when the terrorists are found, Blue forces 
can receive very high casualties as they get in close contact.  The analytical explanation 



















Figure 12.   Comparisons of Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
The null hypothesis suggests that there is no difference between both 
scenarios.  Contrarily, the alternative hypothesis claims that Blue would receive higher 
casualties when search operations are conducted in hostile environments and suggests 
that the difference between both scenarios in terms of Blue casualties is expected to be 
less than zero. 
The Z test for these scenarios; 
• Ha : X1 – Y1 < 0    
• X  = 1.3    Y  = 1.78     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s2x =  2.36     s2y = 6.55 
• P-value = 0.0125 
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Notice that the variance of search operations conducted in hostile 
environment scenario is almost three times higher than the variance of the baseline 
scenario.  This indicates that we can get extreme outcomes in a hostile village in terms of 
Blue casualties.  For a P-value of 0.0125 the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis.  We conclude that when a skirmish occurs in a search operation 
the behavior of the villagers significantly affects the number of Blue casualties. 
b. Difference between Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
The bar chart in Figure 13 indicates a difference between the numbers of 
mean Red casualties, in both scenarios. The y-axis represents the frequency of Red 
casualties for the 200 replications made. The x-axis represents the number of casualties.   
The support of the sympathetic villagers seems to affect the number of Red casualties 
significantly.  It can be seen that for the 200 replications made the Blue forces were 




















Figure 13.   Comparisons of Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
The Z test for these scenarios; 
• Ha :  X2 – Y2 > 0    
• X  = 2.95    Y  = 0 .91    
• mx = 200   my = 200  
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• s2x =  0.73       s2y = 0 .699 
• P-value = 0 
Looking at the mean Blue and Red casualties given above, we see that the 
mean number of Red casualties in the baseline scenario is around three times higher than 
the mean number of Red casualties of search operations conducted in a hostile village.  
This also indicates that the mean number of terrorists that escape in the hostile village is 
three times as many as the number of terrorists that escape in the baseline scenario.  The 
Z-test is implied with the results obtained from the 200 replications.  The alternative 
hypothesis suggests that the existence of sympathetic villagers would decrease the 
number of the Red casualties and the difference between both scenarios for Red 
casualties is greater than zero.  The P-value strongly support the alternative hypothesis, 
the null hypothesis is rejected.  We conclude that the support from the inhabitants of a 
village to the terrorists, in search operation would increase the number of Blue casualties 
and decrease the numbers of Red casualties. 
4. Test for Difference between Baseline Scenario and Reserve Unit 
In the scenario, the reserve unit has an observational task initially. The unit 
provides assistance to the search units when it receives information about the presence of 
terrorists.  The expectation of a commander to employ a reserve unit would be to 
decrease the Blue casualties and to increases the Red casualties. 
a. Difference between Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
Examining the chart in Figure 14 we cannot say that deploying a reserve 
unit necessarily decreases the number of Blue casualties.  The chart also indicates that 
Blue can sometimes suffer very high casualties when a reserve unit is deployed.  This is 
because the number of soldiers increases in the area and when the reserve unit is 
dismounted close to the terrorists, the terrorists shoot at the soldiers.  In real-world 
skirmishes when the terrorists detect helicopters in a close area they often shoot at them.  
This in turn, sometimes causes helicopter crashes and high casualties.  
All of the soldiers in the reserve unit have night-vision goggles, so they 
have a high sensor range.  The high sensor range has a slight positive effect on the mean 
Blue casualties.  By positive effect, we mean that increasing the Blue sensor range 
somewhat increases the Blue casualties.  Although it looks bizarre initially, when 
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observing the scenario it becomes clear; when the Blue forces have higher sensor ranges 
they can detect the terrorists most of the time, and they will try to eliminate them.  In this 
case, the terrorists who are trying to flee will have to return fire in order to protect 



















Figure 14.   Comparisons of Blue Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
The alternative hypothesis suggests that the employment of a reserve unit 
would decrease the number of Blue casualties.  Accordingly, the difference between the 
mean Blue casualties should be greater than zero.  However, the results obtained from the 
test do not support this idea. 
• Ha : X1 – Y1 > 0    
• X  = 1.3    Y  = 1.88     
• mx = 200   my = 200  
• s2x = 2.36      s2y = 4.166 
• P-value = 0.99 
Note that for search operations where a reserve unit is employed the mean 
number of Blue casualties is around 40% higher than when a reserve unit is not employed 
(baseline scenario).  Analytically the Z-test for the two populations indicates that the  
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reserve unit does not decrease the number of Blue casualties.  In fact, if we test Ha: X1 – 
Y1 > 0 the P-value is 0.99.  Thus, we conclude that contrary to our expectations there are 
more Blue casualties with reserve units in this scenario. 
b. Difference between Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
The chart in Figure 15 shows that there is a significant difference between 
both scenarios, in terms of Red casualties.  Almost in half of the replications, all four of 
the terrorists are eliminated when the reserve team is deployed.  Visually inspecting the 
chart we can say that the reserve unit provides the necessary help to the commander to 




















Figure 15.   Comparisons of Red Casualties for Both Scenarios 
 
Analytically, the alternative test suggests that the difference between both 
scenarios in terms of mean Red casualties is less than zero.  In this case the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative.  It should be also noted that the 
mean number of terrorists that escape the reserve unit is almost half of the mean number 
of the terrorists that escape in the baseline scenario. 
The Z test for these scenarios: 
• Ha : X2 – Y2 < 0    
• X  = 2.95    Y  = 3.45     
• mx =200   my =200  
47 
• s2x  =  0.73      s2y = 0 .44 
• P-value = 0 
For this scenario a specific situation occurred.  Although the number of 
Red casualties increases, the number of Blue casualties also increases when the reserve 
unit is deployed.  From a commander’s prospective, we would favor the scenario that 
decreases the Blue casualties while increasing the Red casualties.  But we do not see that 
here.  The risk that the commander would like to take becomes an important factor at this 
phase.  If the commander does not want to take high risks, or suffer high Blue casualties, 
he may chose to not deploy a reserve unit.  But, on the other hand, if the goal is definitely 
to eliminate as many terrorists as possible, the reserve unit might be employed.  A third 
possibility is to look at the ratio of the Blue casualties to the Red casualties to decide 
whether the employment of a reserve unit is favorable.  For the sake of this study we will 
conclude that the scenario resulting in a lower ratio of Blue to Red casualties will be 
favored.  As we look at the exchange ratio, we expect that there are some zeros in the 
denominator.  This is the reason why the bootstrap method is used to evaluate the 
difference between both scenarios.  The following results are obtained from the 
implication of the bootstrap method: [Ref 15] the code implemented is developed by 
Associate Professor Thomas Lucas and is displayed in the Appendix D. 
 
*** Bootstrap Results for the Baseline Scenario *** 
 
> summary (out.con) 
      Min.          1st Qu.            Median             Mean             3rd Qu.            Max.  
 0.3282051       0.4174594     0.4405477      0.4424048       0.4678155      0.5700000 
 
*** Bootstrap Results for the Reserve Unit *** 
> summary(out.res) 
      Min.             1st Qu.            Median              Mean             3rd Qu.             Max.  
            0.5153645      0.5447278        0.5463647    0.5766558        0.7052023 
 
We use the data obtained from the bootstrap method to conduct another 
hypothesis test.  One might expect that a reserve unit contribute the security forces.  Then 
the ratio of the Blue to the Red casualties should decrease whenever a reserve unit is 
employed and the difference of the ratio for the alternative hypothesis should be greater 
than zero. 
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For this case X1 is the number mean number of Blue casualties for the 
baseline scenario, Y1 is the mean number of Red casualties for the baseline scenario, X2 is 
the mean number of Blue casualties for the scenario where the reserve unit is employed 
and Y2 is the mean number of Red casualties where the reserve unit is employed. 
• The null hypothesis Ho  =  X1/Y1 – X2/Y2 = 0 










• P-value = 0.96 
The P-value does not support the alternative hypothesis test.  The null 
hypothesis is not rejected.  We cannot conclude that the reserve unit is providing a 
satisfactory contribution to the security forces.  As the number of Blue casualties also 
increases the deployment of the reserve unit is not favored in this case.   
C. ANALYSIS OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO WITH THE REGRESSION 
TREES 
This section looks at the analysis of the mean Red casualties and mean Blue 
casualties as a function of the 16 factors described for the baseline scenario.  Regression 
trees are used to explore the data set obtained from the simulations of around three 
thousand search operations.  Regression trees are preferred here as they are easy to 
understand and to interpret.  They also provide a satisfactory treatment of missing values.  
In addition, it is easy to obtain and visualize general interaction forms.  Moreover, the 
results are invariant to monotonic transformations in the response. [Ref 16] Finally they 
are also robust to outliers [Ref 14] 
1. Regression Trees for Blue Casualties  
This subsection examines the mean Blue casualties according to the sixteen 
factors defined for the baseline scenario.  The factors that appear on the regression tree 
are: 
• SearchT_MSpeed (Movement Speed):  This parameter is the speed of 
the search unit that enters the village.    
• Ter_OC3_Stealth (Stealth):  The stealth parameter in MANA represents 
the difficulty in detecting an entity when it enters the sensor range.  This 
parameter affects the Red agents’ visibility when they enter the sensor 
range of other agents. 
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• Ter_OC3_OT3 (Enemy Threat3):  This parameter affects the propensity 
of the terrorists to move toward or move away from the security forces.   
• SearchT_OC3_Stealth (Stealth):  This parameter affects the search 
unit’s probability to be seen by other agents. 
• TC_ComRel (Communication Reliability):  This parameter affects the 
probability that information is sent to the desired destination. 
The residual mean deviance of the tree model in Figure 14 is 0.15.      
The residual deviance is the sum of the squared variation of the 
observations in a tree model depending on the type of the tree 
(classification/regression).  The residual mean deviance is calculated by 
dividing the residual deviance by the number of observation minus the 
number of terminal nodes, in other words, by dividing the residual 
deviance to the degree of freedom.  [Ref 16]   
Looking at the tree we can see that there is a lot of variation in the number of Blue 
casualties.  The mean Blue casualties range from .66 to 2.1. 
 











Figure 16.   Regression Tree Model of MOE 1     
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The regression tree model in Figure 16 indicates that the speed at which the 
search team is inserted is the main factor affecting the Blue casualties.  An initial 
observation of the figure gives the impression that a lower speed is better for the Blue 
search unit.  Looking closely at the scenario with several replications at different speed 
levels, it is realized that the slower the speed of the Blue search teams the higher the Blue 
casualties.  In the scenario, the search unit is inserted in two components into the village.  
One of the teams comes from the north and the other from the south.  The team coming 
from the north is better equipped than the other one and has a higher sensor range.  In 
addition, the team coming from the south comes from an area with lower altitude.  This 
fact affects the sensor range of the dogs, which are the main source of information for the 
Red forces.  In other words, the dogs detect the Blue forces coming from the north before 
they detect the other team.  As soon as the terrorists (Red forces) receive any information 
about the presence of the Blue forces they try to flee.  In this case, when the speeds for 
both search teams is the same, the terrorists detect the search team coming from the north 
first and try to flee from the south of the village.  This causes the terrorists to run into the 
Blue team coming from the south—which is poorer in terms of equipment and this causes 
higher Blue casualties.  When the speed of the team coming from the south is higher, the 
terrorists detect both search teams almost at the same time and try to evade both teams.  
In fact, in real-world operations one of the times that the troops are more vulnerable is 
when unarmored vehicles carry them.  The enemy can ambush, fire at or attack the Blue 
forces easily as the troops are not positioned and exactly ready for combat.  In the 
scenario, Red forces are trying to evade and when they run into the search team coming 
from the south, they come in close contact and engage them.  This increases the Blue 
casualties and also the Red casualties.  In Figure 17, the search teams and the road that 
they follow are shown and in Figure 18, the shape of the terrain is displayed in a two-




Figure 17.   The Roads Followed by the Search Teams 
 
Looking at Figure 18, we can see that the dogs can detect the trucks coming from 
the north first, if both teams enter the village at the same speed.  If the movement is 
synchronized and the trucks coming from the south are faster than the ones coming from 
the north, detecting both search teams almost at the same time, the terrorists try to move 
away from both.  In this case, the troops dismount the trucks and start pursuing or 
searching the enemy.  It is important that the Blue forces dismount the trucks first and 
then contact the terrorists.  The Blue receives higher casualties if they contact the 
terrorists before dismounting the trucks. 
The lesson learned from this case is that the shape of the terrain should be 
evaluated carefully in the planning process of any search operation.  Still, the high speed 
is of high value but synchronization of the speeds of the search team inserted into the 
village also has a high importance. 
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Figure 18.   The Two-Dimensional View of the Area 
 
In Figure 16 we see that the other factors affecting the Blue casualties are the 
stealth of the Red forces, the stealth of the Blue forces, the Red propensity to move 
toward the Blue and the communication reliability of the Blue forces.  The stealth of the 
Red forces and the Red propensity to move toward the Blue initially seem to be factors 
that cannot be affected by the Blue forces.  As there are a lot of Blue troops in the area 
doing the search operation, the variability of the mean number of Blue casualties is also 
high.  The tree indicates that the lowest mean casualties received by the Blue forces is 
around .65.  This happens when the speed of the search teams are set appropriately, the 
Red propensity to move toward the Blue is less than 35 (terrorists are not very 
aggressive), and the Blue search team stealth is over 53.5 (the probability of spotting a 
member of the Blue search team if in range is reduced more than a half per time step).  
The Blue receives the highest casualties when the Red stealth is over 69.5 (the probability 
of detecting the terrorists is less than one third of what it otherwise would be per time 
step). Two of the factors appearing on the tree are the Red factors and at a first glance it 
seems that we cannot change them.  In fact, the Red stealth can be affected by focusing 
on increasing the Blue ability to detect the Red forces and the Red propensity to move 
toward the Blue can be affected by making the Blue deterrent forces.  On the other hand, 
53 
the stealth of the Blue forces (which is closely related to Blue training) and the 
communication reliability are important factors to consider by the Blue forces.  
Figure 19 (a truncated regression tree) indicates that when the speed of the Blue 
forces is set accordingly just two of the factors can explain a great proportion of the 
variability of the Blue casualties.  For example, if the speed is over 825 (over 23 km/hr) 
and the Red propensity to move toward the Blue is less than 43 (a terrorist that does not 
have a strong desire to move towards the blue), the mean Blue casualties decrease to 
0.9051.  If the Red propensity to move toward the Blue is over 43 (a terrorist with a 
strong desire to move towards the blue) the mean Blue casualties increase almost by half 
and become 1.412.  On the right hand side of the regression tree, we can see that the Red 
stealth affects the Blue casualties more severely.  If the stealth is less than 69.5 (i.e., the 
terrorists are not too difficult to spot if in range, with less than a two thirds reduction in 
detection probability), the Blue casualties average 1.325.  If it is over this value, the Blue 
casualties average 2.196.  The residual mean deviance for this tree is .2.  This is again 
because of the high variability of the mean Blue casualties.  It should be noted that just by 
varying two of the variables, the mean Blue casualties increase from .9 to 2.16.  This fact 
reveals the importance of the factors displayed in the tree model shown in Figure 19.  In 
fact the same three factors are found to be the most important factors in the linear 
regression model and are displayed in Table1. 
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Regression Trees for Blue Casualties  
|teamNVG.D.MSpeed<825
Ter.OC3.OT3<43 Ter.OC3.Stealth<69.5
0.9051 1.4120 1.3250 2.1690
 
Figure 19.   Regression Tree Model of MOE 1 
 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F
SearchT_MSpeed 1 1 4.934841677 75.49629 5.13E-11
Ter_OC3_Stealth 1 1 4.060424099 62.11891 6.98E-10
Ter_OC3_OT3 1 1 3.032083611 46.38671 2.42E-08  
Table 1. The Most Important Three Factors Obtained From the Linear Regression 
of the Data Set for the Blue Casualties 
 
Figure 20 shows a leverage plot that displays the partial effect of the Blue search 
team movement speed on the mean number of Blue casualties.  The partial effect is the 
impact of the factor on the response when the response has been regressed on all other 
factors. The x-axis on the plot is the Blue search team initial movement speed and the y-
axis is the mean number of Blue casualties.  It is obvious that increasing the Blue 
movement speed increases the Blue casualties.  Again this is for the reasons explained in 
the discussion of the regression trees. The Leverage plots show the partial effect of the 
variables on the model.  The distance from each point to the horizontal line is what the 
error would expect to be if the effects were not included.  The center red line is the line of  
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fit.  The distance of each point to that fit gives the residual error for that point.  The 
steepness of the confidence curves (the lines around the center line) indicates the level of 
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Figure 20.   Leverage Plot for Blue Movement Speed (Search Team Initial Movement) 
 
Figure 21 displays the leverage plots for the Red stealth and Red propensity to 
move toward (Red aggressiveness) the Blue.  The y-axis represents the mean number of 
Blue casualties for both graphs and the x-axis represent the Red stealth parameter and 
Red aggressiveness.  When both of the factors increase, the mean number of Blue 
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Figure 21.   Leverage Plots for the Terrorists’ Stealth and Terrorists’ Propensity to 
Move Toward the Blue Forces (Aggressiveness) 
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2. Regression Trees for Red Casualties  
This subsection examines the analysis of the baseline scenario in terms of Red 
casualties as a function of the sixteen factors stated previously.  The factors that appear 
on the tree model are: 
• Ter_OC3_Stealth (Stealth):  This parameter affects the Red agents’ 
visibility when they enter in the sensor range of other agents. 
• SearchT_ITR (Inorganic Threat Rate): The inorganic threat rate is the 
number of time steps that must pass for a threat on the Inorganic 
Situational Awareness map to disappear. [Ref 6] 
• Ter_OC3_OT3 (Enemy Threat3):  This parameter affects the propensity 
of the terrorists to move toward or move away from the security forces. 
• SearchT_MSpeed (Movement Speed):  This parameter is the speed of 
the search unit that enters the village. 
• SearchT_NT (Non-target Classes):  The villagers are defined as agents 
that cannot be targeted. This factor is defined to explore the effects of the 
presence of civilian in the area when a skirmish occurs. 
The residual mean deviation of the tree model for the Red casualties is .012.  This 
means that the predicted values are quite precise.  Observing the tree, we can see that 
there is little variation in the mean Red casualties.  The number of Red casualties ranges 
from 3.008 to 3.788.  
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Figure 22.   Regression Tree Model of MOE 2 
 
The Red stealth is the main factor affecting the Red casualties.  In Figure 22, the 
nodes emanating from the first node indicates interaction between the factors stated.  If 
the Red stealth is over 80.5 (i.e., it is difficult to detect the terrorists, less than one fifth of 
the probability of detection without stealth) and the inorganic threat rate of the Blue team 
is less than 219 (36.5 minutes), then the mean Red casualties is 3.4.  When the inorganic 
threat rate is over 219 and the Red stealth is over 92 (i.e., it is very difficult to detect the 
terrorists, less than one tenth of the probability of detection without stealth), the Red 
casualties decrease to 3.008.  This is the best result that the Red can have.  In other 
words, setting the variables as stated above create the case in which the terrorists receive 
the least casualties.  The inorganic threat rate is the amount of time that a detected entity 
will stay on the situational awareness map.  In a real-world environment this is the 
amount of time that a detected enemy is assumed to stay at the same location.  
Replicating the scenario many times, it is observed that when the inorganic threat rate is 
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high, the Blue search team gathers on a small area and moves toward the point where the 
enemy is detected and assumed to stay.  This reduces the probability of contacting the 
other Red forces that could be around.  Contrarily, when the threat inorganic threat rate is 
low, the search team spreads throughout the search area and detects more enemies—
which increases the number of Red casualties.  In Figure 23 we can see that although the 
terrorists (agents in red colors) are killed by the snipers, the Blue search team is still 
searching the area.  This is true because the terrorists killed by the snipers still look alive 
to the search team (the blue moving agents) inorganic situational awareness map.  And, 
as we can see, the search team is searching a small proportion of the area and 
simultaneously the fourth terrorist is escaping the Blue forces. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Blue Search Team Searching the Terrorists 
 
In Figure 24, the search team (Blue moving agents) is gathered again to find the 
terrorists.  Unfortunately, by this time the terrorist is already gone.  We can see the 
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terrorist (red agent) evading the Blue forces.  But as the inorganic threat rate of the Blue 
search team is high, the team is still searching the area according to the stale information 
it received.  This is also the case in the real world.  When information is received about 
the presence of terrorists at a specific location, we can move to that point and search the 
area although the enemy has already gone when we reach that point.  Sometimes security 
forces receive stale intelligence or information and operations are conducted according to 
this information. A question still remains to be answered: how long should we assume 




Figure 24.   Blue Search Team Searching the Terrorists  
 
Looking at the tree model in Figure 22, the left-hand side of the regression tree 
shows that there are interactions between Red stealth, Red propensities to move toward 
the Blue, Blue movement speed, and the presence of the villagers.  Examining each node 
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differently, it is obvious that increasing aggressiveness of the Red increases the Red 
casualties.  If the speed of both Blue search units (the unit coming from the north and the 
unit coming from the south) is decreased equally the Red casualties increase.  This is 
because when the speed of the Blue search teams coming from the north and from the 
south are set to a lower and equivalent level, the terrorists first detect the team coming 
from the north and try to flee toward the south of the village and encounter the team 
coming from the south.  This in turn increases the number of Red casualties as well as the 
Blue casualties.  Beyond this, an important factor affecting the Red casualties is the 
presence of the villagers in the area.  When the Red stealth is less than 80.5, Red 
aggressiveness is less than 35.5 (terrorists do not have a strong desire to move towards 
the Blue), the speeds of the Blue search teams are less than 860 (less than 24 km/hr) and 
with the presence of the villagers (the Blue try not to shoot the villagers or accidentally 
kill any villagers), the mean Red casualties decrease to 3.46.  It is obvious from the tree 
that when the Blue search team tries to avoid targeting the villagers (Search_NT >0.5), 
the Red casualties decrease.  The interesting result is that although a few villagers are 
defined in the scenario, from the tree we can see that the presence of civilians in the area 
decreases the number of Red casualties.  This is because the Blue forces are concerned 
about damaging civilian property and injuring civilians.  This fact reduces the Blue 
firepower and with reduced firepower the number of Red casualties declines.  Walking 
through the tree, we see that if the villagers are not defined as non-targeted agents 
(Search_NT<0.5) and Red stealth is over 53.5 (the probability of detecting the terrorists if 
in range, is less than a half), the Red casualties average 3.606.  If Red stealth is less than 
53.5, the Red casualties average 3.788.  This is the highest number of casualties that the 
Red can receive if the factors are set as shown in the tree.  The fit of the three is quite 
good.  The residual mean device of the tree is 0.012.  This signifies that the predicted 
values of the tree are quite precise. 
In Figure 25 a truncated version of the regression tree for Red casualties is 
displayed.  Here we want to observe the variability of the Red casualties according to the 
most two important factors affecting this number.  The residual mean deviance is 0.02.  
This shows us that there is a low deviance between the responses (predicted outcomes) in 
the tree model, and this indicates that we can predict the number of Red casualties with 
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high precision just by varying the two factors: the Red stealth and the inorganic threat 
rate of the Blue search team.  If the value of the Red stealth is set to be less than the 80.5, 
then the mean Red casualties is 3.626.  On the other hand, if the value of the Red stealth 
is set to be over 80.5 (i.e., it is difficult to detect the terrorists, less than one fifth of 
probability of detection) and the inorganic threat rate of the Blue is less than 219 (36.5 
minutes), the average Red casualties decrease to 3.4.  If the stealth value of the Red 
forces stays over 80.5 and the inorganic threat rate for the Blue search team is over 219, 
then the mean Red casualties decrease to 3.138. 
 






Figure 25.   Regression Tree Model of MOE 2     
 
Figure 26 displays the leverage plots for the Red stealth and Blue search team 
inorganic threat rate.  Those factors are the first two factors appearing on the regression 
tree for Red casualties.  The graphs show the effect of both factors on the Red casualties.  
The y-axis represents the mean number of Red casualties while the x-axis sequentially 
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represents the Red stealth and Blue search team inorganic threat rate.  The graphs 
indicate that both factors negatively affect the Blue casualties.  In other words, increasing 
Red stealth or Blue search team inorganic threat rate decreases the number of Red 
casualties.  In leverage plots, the steepness of the fit line indicates the level of 
significance of the factor to the response variable.  It should be also noted that the effect 
of the Blue search team inorganic threat rate is not as significant as the effect of the Red 
stealth.  The leverage plots are given here in order to amplify the results obtained from 
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Figure 26.   Leverage Plots for the Red Stealth and Blue Search Team Inorganic 
Threat Rate 
 
This chapter explained the results obtained from the analysis of the data set and 
the comparisons of the scenarios.  The next chapter will discuss the conclusions drawn 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter contains the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the sixteen 
factors data set as well as the conclusions obtained from the comparisons of the five 
scenarios.  
• The proficiency level of the soldiers and the equipment used significantly 
affect the outcome of a search operation.  Thus, whenever possible, well-
trained professionals should be used in search operations. 
• The employment of village guards is highly beneficial in decreasing the 
Blue casualties, at least as modeled in the scenario.  In this study, the 
village guards are only used to observe the Red force’s activities and to 
join the Blue search team when they come into the village.  The important 
point is that the village guards have a visibility of 150 meters and this is 
not extremely high.  We want to emphasize that even a relatively small 
help (the initial location of the terrorists) provided from the village, either 
from village guards or from villagers, is highly important to the Blue 
forces.   
• The support of the local people is critical to the Blue forces.  For a village 
search operation, the support of the villagers to the terrorists highly affects 
the number of Blue casualties. 
• Intelligence is a key factor for search operations.  The Blue forces should 
have information about the presence of any kinds of caches or tunnels 
built in the area. 
• For this specific case, the employment of a reserve unit did not seem to be 
very beneficial.  We conclude that if appropriate cordon and search 
techniques are implemented, as modeled in the scenario, the employment 
of a reserve might not be favored.  In fact, if the commander is concerned 
more about the number of Blue casualties, he might not want to use a 
reserve unit in this case.  But, if the commander is determined to eliminate 
the Red casualties at all cost, he might want to use a reserve unit. 
• The speed of the Blue forces inserted into the village is the most important 
factor affecting the Blue casualties.  The speed might have hazardous 
effects if considered independent from the shape of the terrain.  Terrain 
and speed should be considered together to make the speed an 
advantageous factor for the Blue forces.  In the scenario, the search team 
divides into two components and is inserted following the roads from the 
north and from the south. Synchronization becomes an important factor.  




• The Red stealth is the most important factor affecting the Red casualties, 
and it is also an important factor affecting the Blue casualties.  The Blue 
forces should focus on decreasing the Red stealth by using appropriate 
equipment like night-vision goggles. 
• Red aggressiveness is an important factor affecting both the Red and the 
Blue casualties. The casualties of Blue forces decrease when the Red 
avoids contacting the Blue.   
• Reliable communication has an important impact on Blue casualties.  The 
capability of the communication devices should be increased and good 
communication techniques should be implemented. 
• The presence of the civilians decreases the firepower of the Blue forces 
who are concerned about civilians’ life and property.  The civilian 
component should be included in the planning process of search 
operations.   
• In order to find if an individual fault is critical to the results of the 
operation, we varied the stealth value of the sniper placed on the hill close 
to the village. When the stealth value is less than 100, the terrorists detect 
them immediately and run away.  In this case the other sniper team and the 
forces positioned in the outer cordon team targets them.  This indicates 
that the individual faults may not always be critical.  
• All of the questions and factors explored in this study are based on 
concerns personally experienced in real-world situations.  MANA (Map 
Aware Non-Uniform Automata) proved to be efficient at exploring the 
factors affecting the non-linear nature of a search operation and the 
emergent behavior in low-intensity conflicts.   
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter details the recommendations both to the developers of the model and 
the analyst interested in studying in this area.  The recommendations stated in this chapter 
concern either the limitations faced in this study or the features that may be considered by 
the developers to improve the ability of the model to tackle other problems.  The 
recommendations for the analyst consist of possible areas of study as well as some 
recommendations for modeling. 
B. MODEL DEVELOPERS 
This section includes the recommendations to the developers, either about the 
problems faced or about the features that might help the model deal with other real-world 
problem. 
• MANA does not provide the ability to change the number of agents 
between states.  In the scenario called Reserve units, the reserve unit is 
carried by helicopter and whenever a terrorist is detected, a state change 
representing the unit dismounting the helicopter is triggered.  In order to 
represent the seventeen soldiers dismounting the helicopter seventeen 
helicopters were used. Because in MANA it is not possible to change the 
number of agents changing between states.  This causes a visualization 
problem.  Also, a high distance occurs between helicopters when they are 
flying.  This in turn affects the state change and some of the helicopters 
keep flying instead of performing the state change.   
• No kind of formation can be defined in MANA.  Conventional military 
tactics requires the uses of appropriate formation techniques for the 
conducted operation.  In our scenario, during the search operations when 
the search unit receives any information indicating the presence of Red 
agents, the unit moves toward the area without using any formation.  In 
this case, as the search team gathers to move to the waypoint some areas 
are not searched.  If any formation could have been used it would be 
possible to move toward the waypoint, to spread the soldiers, and to search 
the area at the same time. 
• In MANA it is difficult to associate the names and the features that they 
represent.  From a military perspective, it would be easier to understand 




• In MANA, only a waypoint and an alternative waypoint can be defined for 
any entities.  But sometimes it becomes necessary to have more alternative 
waypoints.  For example, let’s say that in a scenario a reserve unit is 
supposed to assist one of the four units located in different areas when 
they contact the enemy.  The reserve unit would choose the unit that is in 
the most critical situation. The same situation could be represented in 
MANA if it were possible to define more alternative waypoints. 
• Although some of the agent-based models provide the ability to define a 
hierarchy, MANA does not have such a property.  This becomes important 
for maneuvers.  If the idea is to create a scenario where a maneuver is to 
be represented, a unit should suppress the enemy with its firepower while 
the other is maneuvering.  This requires leadership.  If hierarchy or 
leadership can be incorporated in MANA these scenarios can be created 
easily. 
• The manual of MANA includes the necessary detail of the model, which 
makes it easy to understand.  But learning the technical details of the 
model does not exactly mean learning modeling.  Due to their nature, 
agent-based models have some characteristics that a beginner needs to 
understand. A section including modeling techniques might help to save 
time for the beginner.  An important assistance provided by Mitre and the 
Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC), 
Monterey, for this study helped to clarify the modeling techniques.  
C. ANALYST   
This section gives some recommendations to the analyst intending to study this 
area. 
• A study including civil-military relations can be done in an area where a 
low-intensity conflict exists.  The analyst can initially create a scenario in 
which local people are sympathetic to the insurgency to explore the effects 
of a good civil-military relationship.  The refueling feature incorporated in 
MANA allows modeling propaganda.  
• A stepwise method of developing a scenario is highly important.  The 
developers must make sure that each entity defined in the scenario clearly 
plays the role that it is assumed to play before adding new ones. 
• Before developing scenarios, it should be understood that all agent-based 
models are initially developed for different purposes.  Great care should be 
given for choosing the appropriate model.   
• The analyst should be aware that there are several statistical packages that 
he/she can use instead of just using one—because different statistical 




• The variable selection procedure is one of the most important steps in the 
analysis.  Analysts should ensure that they choose the variables important 
to them or the variables that can explain the variability of the MOEs 
chosen. 
• From experience, defining different single-shot kill probabilities for 
different ranges does not become very useful when the objective is to 
explore these probabilities in a data set.  If the purpose is to explore the 
effect of the variability of the probability of kill, then to define a single 
range and a single probability of kill for this range is recommended.   This 
is true because with agent-based models the idea is usually to find the 
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PERSONALITY 
PARAMETERS 
71 
Description Controls propensity to move toward/away from 
Agent SA – Response by agent to information it has obtained in the current model 
step 
Enemies Agents of enemy allegiance within sensor range 
Enemy Threat 1 Agents of enemy allegiance threat 1 within sensor range 
Enemy Threat 2 Agents of enemy allegiance threat 2 within sensor range 
Enemy Threat 3 Agents of enemy allegiance threat 3 within sensor range 
Ideal Enemy 
Agents of enemy allegiance within sensor range that are 
have the ideal enemy class. This class is defined in the 
“En. Class” box to the right. 
Friends 
Agents of same allegiance within sensor range. The squad 
only/all friends toggle box allows the user to select what 
friends are referred to for this and the next weighting. 
Injured Friends 
Injured agents of same allegiance within sensor range. 
The toggle box for non-injured friends applies similarly 
here. 
Neutrals Agents of neutral allegiance within sensor range 
Next Waypoint The next waypoint agent's squad has been assigned 
Alternate Waypoint The alternate waypoint agent's squad has been assigned 
Easy Going Areas with easy going within 5 pixels of agent 
Cover Areas with protection from fire within 5 pixels of agent 
Concealment Areas which improve stealth within 5 pixels of agent 
Centre The centre line (defined as line between the current and immediately past goal) 
Squad SA – Response to contacts on squad’s SA map 
Enemy Threat 1 Enemies which are of Threat Level 1 
Enemy Threat 2 Enemies which are of Threat Level 2 
Enemy Threat 3 Enemies which are of Threat Level 3 
Description Controls propensity to move toward/away from 
Squad Friends Agents of same squad 
Other Friends Agents of same allegiance but not in same squad  
Neutrals Neutral agents 
Unknowns Contact detections that have not been classified 
Inorganic SA – Response to contacts on squad’s Inorganic SA map 
Enemy Threat 1 Enemies which are of Threat Level 1 
Enemy Threat 2 Enemies which are of Threat Level 2 
Enemy Threat 3 Enemies which are of Threat Level 3 
Friends Agents of same allegiance 
Neutrals Neutral agents 
Unknowns Contact detections that have not been classified 
 













APPENDIX B. TABLE OF DESIGN REPRESENTING THE 
RANGES OF PARAMETERS 
Identifier N Rows Ter_OC3-EaTer_OCTer_OC3ssl Ter_OC3_ SteaTer_OC3_ OT3 Ter_OC3_ SR SniperStealth SearchT_Fw_Stealth
I0E0 50 81 -86 3960 56 -71 60 84 75
I0E1 50 96 43 4200 62 -29 30 51 57
I0E10 50 68 -92 4120 69 -56 23 63 38
I0E11 50 98 4 5320 94 -62 67 39 72
I0E12 50 70 -53 8040 76 -20 48 66 46
I0E13 50 85 10 5640 92 -44 33 97 78
I0E14 50 72 -32 7960 86 -11 45 49 54
I0E15 50 78 16 6520 81 -68 62 96 98
I0E16 50 90 -11 5080 43 34 51 99 76
I0E17 50 71 70 3000 57 16 31 64 40
I0E18 50 82 -20 4040 54 55 10 92 91
I0E19 50 74 46 3880 39 10 38 46 51
I0E2 50 92 -26 5400 49 -38 25 90 68
I0E20 50 88 -56 6120 41 94 72 59 87
I0E21 50 86 64 6760 45 4 36 80 44
I0E22 50 99 -17 5880 51 91 21 43 70
I0E23 50 73 97 7400 59 37 68 69 49
I0E24 50 75 -47 3640 73 61 65 82 35
I0E25 50 83 25 4760 99 52 11 47 71
I0E26 50 89 -77 4520 86 7 34 93 42
I0E27 50 93 67 3320 88 82 52 55 81
I0E28 50 95 -38 7640 74 28 54 48 55
I0E29 50 80 85 7320 82 76 24 98 74
I0E3 50 76 76 3400 64 -83 63 62 48
I0E30 50 77 -71 6840 71 88 16 61 41
I0E31 50 91 31 6200 90 43 58 76 69
I0E32 50 67 1 5560 67 1 40 67 67
I0E33 50 53 88 7160 78 73 20 50 59
I0E34 50 38 -41 6920 72 31 50 83 77
I0E35 50 42 28 5720 85 40 55 44 66
I0E36 50 58 -74 7720 70 85 17 72 86
I0E37 50 40 7 4840 98 79 27 89 61
I0E38 50 65 -80 3560 68 67 61 57 95
I0E39 50 50 61 3240 97 49 66 78 52
I0E4 50 94 -5 6280 36 -77 53 45 73
I0E40 50 47 -50 4440 79 25 37 40 97
I0E41 50 55 91 6440 47 19 39 60 84
I0E42 50 37 -35 5960 50 97 71 81 45
I0E43 50 66 94 7000 65 58 57 71 96
I0E44 50 36 -2 5800 40 64 13 95 62
I0E45 50 64 55 3080 58 22 32 68 88
I0E46 50 49 -8 5480 42 46 47 37 56
I0E47 50 62 34 3160 38 13 35 85 80
I0E48 50 56 -14 4600 53 70 18 38 36
I0E49 50 44 13 6040 91 -32 29 35 58
I0E5 50 69 82 7560 66 -65 19 77 39
I0E50 50 63 -68 8120 77 -14 49 70 94
I0E51 50 52 22 7080 80 -53 70 42 43
I0E52 50 60 -44 7240 95 -8 42 88 83
I0E53 50 46 58 5000 93 -92 8 75 47
I0E54 50 48 -62 4360 89 -2 44 54 90
I0E55 50 35 19 5240 83 -89 59 91 64
I0E56 50 61 -95 3720 75 -35 12 65 85
I0E57 50 59 49 7480 61 -59 15 52 99
I0E58 50 51 -23 6360 35 -50 69 87 63
I0E59 50 45 79 6600 48 -5 46 41 92
I0E6 50 84 -59 7880 37 -47 14 56 82
I0E60 50 41 -65 7800 46 -80 28 79 53
I0E61 50 39 40 3480 60 -26 26 86 79
I0E62 50 54 -83 3800 52 -74 56 36 60
I0E63 50 57 73 4280 63 -86 64 73 93
I0E64 50 43 -29 4920 44 -41 22 58 65
I0E7 50 87 52 6680 55 -23 43 94 37
I0E8 50 79 -89 4680 87 -17 41 74 50
I0E9 50 97 37 5160 84 -95 9 53 89  
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SearchT_OC3_StealthSearchT_Mspeed SearchT_OC3_OT3SearchTnoNVG_SR TC_ComRel SearchT_ITR SearchT_sskpSearchT_NT Blue Cas Red Cas
79 860 -2 70 81 247 7600 1 1.1 3.72
45 700 49 54 94 345 4410 1 1 3.52
88 550 37 9 50 324 2320 0 0.7 3.56
49 590 61 28 59 240 2760 0 0.96 3.24
82 470 -41 69 96 65 1330 1 0.76 3.5
60 380 -95 41 69 114 3090 1 0.68 3.14
90 650 85 17 88 1 4080 0 1.1 3.52
63 990 13 37 87 163 1770 0 1.86 3.16
59 850 91 45 73 142 2980 1 2 3.52
80 880 58 31 82 51 1000 1 1.16 3.52
68 370 -17 42 86 219 1550 0 0.68 3.74
81 630 -62 60 91 23 3970 0 0.6 3.88
92 450 -8 34 72 359 7160 0 0.52 3.78
61 360 40 27 41 191 2210 1 1.34 3.82
98 660 76 19 57 415 3200 1 0.92 3.6
51 810 -71 44 56 254 2870 0 1.28 3.76
94 720 -53 72 39 317 2430 0 0.86 3.76
58 950 -65 14 45 121 5620 1 1.66 3.68
95 760 -26 32 64 16 7050 1 2.02 3.46
43 560 88 57 51 100 5180 0 1.68 3.26
72 430 31 55 58 170 7930 0 1.84 3.58
41 610 -80 22 90 394 4850 1 0.8 3.6
77 570 7 12 85 275 5730 1 1.72 3.38
56 520 -44 16 98 408 5400 0 0.7 3.7
50 840 52 67 97 366 4740 0 2.74 3.62
97 930 34 50 74 373 6390 0 1.86 3.34
67 670 1 40 67 226 4520 1 1.08 3.54
55 480 4 10 53 205 1440 0 1.66 3.66
89 640 -47 26 40 107 4630 0 0.6 3.68
42 890 10 46 62 93 1880 1 1.54 3.6
78 820 46 64 36 44 3640 1 1.4 3.8
48 830 -20 33 68 422 2100 0 4.08 2.92
96 900 -68 15 92 268 2540 0 1.14 3.64
64 420 16 62 71 296 1660 1 1.56 3.14
86 510 22 47 66 30 6940 1 0.58 3.66
87 540 94 56 79 443 3530 1 0.98 3.48
35 740 79 21 80 72 5290 0 0.88 3.66
39 400 25 29 99 149 7820 0 0.8 3.7
46 790 -35 71 84 128 6720 1 1.34 3.64
85 750 -59 52 75 212 6280 1 1.4 3.68
52 870 43 11 38 387 7710 0 1.5 3.4
74 960 97 39 65 338 5950 0 1.66 3.74
44 690 -83 63 46 450 4960 1 0.98 3.58
71 350 -11 43 47 289 7270 1 1.32 3.52
75 490 -89 35 61 310 6060 0 0.8 3.38
38 440 70 65 42 184 6500 1 1.54 3.56
54 460 -56 49 52 401 8040 0 0.92 3.54
66 970 19 38 48 233 7490 1 1.62 3.5
53 710 64 20 43 429 5070 1 1.9 3.02
73 980 -38 53 93 261 6830 0 2.78 2.72
36 680 -74 61 77 37 5840 0 1.1 3.42
83 530 73 36 78 198 6170 1 0.72 3.46
40 620 55 8 95 135 6610 1 1.12 3.54
76 390 67 66 89 331 3420 0 0.92 3.6
39 580 28 48 70 436 1990 0 0.7 3.78
91 780 -86 23 83 352 3860 1 0.8 3.6
70 920 -14 18 63 156 7380 0 1.12 3.52
62 910 -29 25 76 282 1110 1 0.92 3.36
93 730 82 58 44 58 4190 0 0.86 3.56
57 770 -5 68 49 177 3310 0 0.76 3.84
84 500 -50 13 37 86 4300 1 0.34 3.62
37 410 -32 30 60 79 2650 1 0.84 3.52
47 800 -92 24 55 9 5510 0 1.14 3.6
99 600 -77 59 54 380 3750 1 0.84 3.14
65 940 -23 51 35 303 1220 1 1.38 3.1  
Table 3. Table of Design  
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APPENDIX C. REGRESSION TREE CODES  
The results obtained from the regression trees are displayed below. 
A. CODE FOR REGRESSION TREES OF BLUE CASUALTIES  
 
*** Tree Model *** 
Regression tree: 
snip.tree(tree = tree(formula = Mean.Alleg1Cas.Blue.. ~ Ter.OC3.EasTer +  
Ter.OC3.InjFr. + Ter.OC3.sskp. + Ter.OC3.Stealth. + Ter.OC3.OT3. + 
 Ter.OC3.SR. + Sniper1Stealth + Search.FWP.Stealth. +  
 SearchT.OC3.Stealth. + SearchT.MSpeed. + SearchT.OC3.OT3. +  
 SearchNoNVG.SR. + TC.ComRel. + SearchT.ITR. + SearchT.sskp. +  
 SearchT.NT, data = aydin.3data.By..Identifier., na.action = na.exclude, 
 mincut = 5, minsize = 13, mindev = 0.01), nodes = 19.) 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
[1] "SearchT.MSpeed."      "Ter.OC3.OT3."         "SearchT.OC3.Stealth." 
[4] "TC.ComRel."           "Ter.OC3.Stealth."     
Number of terminal nodes:  8  
Residual mean deviance:  0.1572 = 8.958 / 57  
Distribution of residuals: 
      Min.      1st Qu.         Median       Mean         3rd Qu.      Max.  
 -0.788900 -0.205000    0.004615     0.000000   0.145000   1.911000 
 
B. CODE FOR TRUNCATED VERSION OF REGRESSION TREES OF 
BLUE CASUALTIES  
 
*** Tree Model *** 
Regression tree: 
snip.tree(tree = tree(formula = Mean.Alleg1Cas.Blue.. ~ Ter.OC3.EasTer +  
Ter.OC3.InjFr. + Ter.OC3.sskp. + Ter.OC3.Stealth. + Ter.OC3.OT3. + 
        Ter.OC3.SR. + Sniper1Stealth + Search.FWP.Stealth. +  
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SearchT.OC3.Stealth. + SearchT.MSpeed. + SearchT.OC3.OT3. +  
SearchNoNVG.SR. + TC.ComRel. + SearchT.ITR. + SearchT.sskp. +  
SearchT.NT, data = aydin.3data.By..Identifier., na.action = na.exclude, 
 mincut = 5, minsize = 10, mindev = 0.01), nodes = c(5., 4.)) 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
[1] "SearchT.MSpeed."  "Ter.OC3.OT3."     "Ter.OC3.Stealth." 
Number of terminal nodes:  4  
Residual mean deviance:  0.1967 = 12 / 61  
Distribution of residuals: 
     Min.        1st Qu.       Median      Mean        3rd Qu.     Max.  
 -0.78890   -0.20510   -0.06514      0.00000    0.17500     1.91100 
 
C. CODE FOR REGRESSION TREES OF RED CASUALTIES  
 
*** Tree Model *** 
Regression tree: 
snip.tree(tree = tree(formula = Mean..Sqd15Cas. ~ Ter.OC3.EasTer +  
Ter.OC3.InjFriends + Ter.OC3.sskp + Ter.OC3.Stealth + Ter.OC3.OT3 + 
Ter.OC3.SR + Sniper1Stealth + teamNVG.FWP.Stealth + teamNVG.OC3.Stealth 
+ teamNVG.D.MSpeed + teamNVG.OC3.OT3 + noNVG.OC3.SR + TC.ComRel 
+ teamNVG.ITR + teamNVG.OC3.sskp + teamNVG.OCt3.NT, data =  
  aydin.2.data.By..Identifier., na.action = na.exclude, mincut = 5, 
  minsize = 10, mindev = 0.01), nodes = c(17., 5.)) 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
[1] "Ter.OC3.Stealth" "Ter.OC3.OT3"  "teamNVG.D.MSpeed" 
"teamNVG.OCt3.NT"  
[5] "teamNVG.ITR"      
Number of terminal nodes:  8  
Residual mean deviance:  0.01212 = 0.6906 / 57  
Distribution of residuals: 
      Min.          1st Qu.             Median             Mean       3rd Qu.      Max.  
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 -0.288000     -0.057140         0.002857       0.000000     0.062860   0.232000 
D. CODE FOR TRUNCATED VERSION OF REGRESSION TREES OF RED 
CASUALTIES  
 
*** Tree Model *** 
Regression tree: 
snip.tree(tree = tree(formula = Mean..Sqd15Cas. ~ Ter.OC3.EasTer +  
Ter.OC3.InjFriends + Ter.OC3.sskp +Ter.OC3.Stealth + Ter.OC3.OT3 + 
Ter.OC3.SR + Sniper1Stealth + teamNVG.FWP.Stealth + teamNVG.OC3.Stealth 
+ teamNVG.D.MSpeed + teamNVG.OC3.OT3 + noNVG.OC3.SR + TC.ComRel 
+ teamNVG.ITR + teamNVG.OC3.sskp + teamNVG.OCt3.NT + Ter.OC3.sskp, 
data = aydin.2.data.By..Identifier., na.action = na.exclude, mincut = 5, 
  minsize = 10, mindev = 0.01), nodes = c(2., 7.)) 
Variables actually used in tree construction: 
[1] "Ter.OC3.Stealth" "teamNVG.ITR"     
Number of terminal nodes:  3  
Residual mean deviance:  0.02013 = 1.248 / 62  
Distribution of residuals: 
    Min.     1st Qu.     Median      Mean       3rd Qu.    Max.  
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APPENDIX D. BOOTSTRAP CODE FOR THE COMPARISON OF 
THE BASELINE SCENARIO AND THE RESERVE UNIT 
Associate Professor Thomas W. Lucas developed the bootstrap code implemented 
in this study and the code is given below: 
#  Define exchange ratio function 
er <- function (x,y) {return(sum(x)/sum(y))} 
#  Do for conscripts 
r.con <- combo.df$red.con 




#  Do for reserves 
r.res <- combo.df$red.res 




#  Build bootstrap 
index <- seq(1, 200, 1) 
B <- 1000 
out.con <- rep(0,B)  
out.res <- rep(0,B)  
for (i in 1:B) 
    { 
     tempi1 <- sample(index, replace = T) 
     tempi2 <- sample(index, replace = T) 
     out.con[i] <- er(b.con[tempi1], r.con[tempi1]) 
     out.res[i] <- er(b.res[tempi2], r.res[tempi2]) 
    } 
hist(out.con) 
hist(out.res) 
#  See how often out.res is less than out.con 
total <- 0 
for (i in 1:B) 
   { 
 total <- total + sum(  out.res < out.con[i] ) 
   } 
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